Volume 46, Issue 1

The term enkrateia appears for the first time in Greek testimonies from the fourth century BC with the meaning of “mastery” or “control over” pleasures. This paper analyzes certain cases of cognates of enkrateia that precede this noun, in order to identify the anticipations of the idea of self-control in the fields of oratory, tragedy and philosophy of the fifth century BC. I will try to show that at this time the verb krateo and the adjective enkrates begin to develop a usage that we can call ‘behavioral’ or ‘ethical’ – since it refers to the character ( ethos ) of the person –, which, in the following century, allowed for the formation of the noun enkrateia to represent this usage.

The essay analyzes some peculiarities of the dialogue between Socrates and Charmides (Xenophon, Memorabilia , III 7), proposing to see the intertext of Mem . III 7 in Plato’s Protagoras . It also aims to show that the strongly anti-democratic attitude usually attributed to Socrates is in fact more typical, in this text, of Charmides’ character. Particular attention is paid to the reference to αἰδώς (and other virtues or passions associated with it) in this and other Greek texts relating to political action.

It is often claimed that the Greeks had a single, straightforward conception of number, based on units that are counted. This conception views numbers as collections of units, a perspective clearly expressed in the second definition of Euclid’s Elements , Book VII. However, we argue that there are a few traces in the Elements of a different conception of number, which we may call ‘divisive’. This conception is grounded in division and multiplication, rather than in the addition of units, and it appears to have deep roots in Plato’s Dialogues . It is probably within the framework of this divisive understanding that we can fully grasp the use of the adjective πρῶτοι to describe prime numbers.

In Ph. I 2.185b19–25, Aristotle puzzlingly challenges essence monism, arguing that, if all things have the same definition and essence, they are nothing at all. In his recent book on Aristotle and the Eleatics, Tim Clarke proposes a traditional reading: if essence monism were true, all opposite predicates would belong to all subjects at the same time, thus making all things self-contradictory and hence annihilating them. In this paper I contend that this standard reading, dating back to Cherniss and Ross, is mistaken. After a preliminary contextualisation of the passage at issue, I present Clarke’s reading and initially strengthen it by referring to a seemingly parallel passage from Metaph . I then discuss the difficulties surrounding the standard reading of these two texts, showing that both need to be interpreted differently. Building on this criticism, I finally set out the requirements that an alternative reading should meet, outlining some of its main features as well.

This article examines the exegetical debate on Aristotle’s conception of phantasmata and its implications for epistemological realism. The discussion centers on whether Aristotle’s realism is “direct”, where cognition engages with reality without intermediaries, or “representational”, where internal representations mediate cognition. It is argued that this discussion arises from and feeds on a “ghostly”, i.e. unspoken, assumption in the exegetical “machine” of Aristotle’s epistemological theory: the interpretation of the nature of phantasmata . Phantasmata , products of phantasia , are typically interpreted in three ways: (1) as internal representations, (2) as physiological processes, or (3) as psychophysical experiences. These three conceptions are discussed with reference to the positions of Victor Caston, Pavel Gregorić, Klaus Corcilius, and David Charles. The article ultimately argues that Aristotle’s phantasmata should be understood as permanent traces of past perceptual experiences. Rather than acting as intermediaries between us and the world, phantasmata retain a causal and structural link to the original perceptual experience. By taking into account the “relational” nature of perceptual experience, this analysis situates Aristotle’s theory as a nuanced alternative to both naïve realism and representationalism.

This paper offers an analysis of the spurious dialogue Eryxias in light of the recent edition by M. Donato (Academia Verlag, Baden-Baden 2023), situating it within the broader context of ancient philosophical reflection on οἰκονομία between the 4th and 3rd centuries BC. After a brief reconstruction of Donato’s main theses, the analysis focuses on several key theoretical issues, such as: the absence of explicit references to the relationship between οἶκος and πόλις – which is a peculiarity compared to earlier economic treatises, the connection between σοφία and external goods as it was developed in the early Academy, and the definitions of πλοῦτος and its proper use, including comparisons with the Epicurean perspective on economy. The paper aims to reassess the Eryxias as an original voice within ancient economic thought, capable of reflecting both the internal tensions of the Hellenistic Platonic Academy and its engagement with contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature, value, and use of wealth in relation to εὐδαιμονία.

This paper shows how the Iamblichean intuition of time apart from change, and this through the reification of time as an Ideal transcending all soul and all genesis, resolves disagreements as to the chronology of the Timaeus myth, thus strengthening arguments for sempiternalism.

This note undertakes an examination of The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Logic , edited by Luca Castagnoli and Paolo Fait, by analysing the majority of its contributions. It explores how the essays elucidate the major developments of ancient logical thought, from its earliest foundations to the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and their enduring influence. The chapters are assessed with regard to clarity and interpretative approach, highlighting both their strengths and points of debate. Ultimately, the review acknowledges that the volume provides an excellent introduction to ancient logic, offering an insightful guide to its key themes and inquiries.