Volume 46, Issue 2

Aristotle’s exploration of the infinite in his Physics III employs a dialectical method to clarify its nature within natural reality. By engaging with his predecessors’ positions, Aristotle delineates three meanings of ‘infinite’, focusing on a traversable, termless principle. His dialectic reveals that the infinite lacks simultaneous actual existence, existing instead in potency, but with a successive actuality in time and motion. This nuanced account resolves apparent contradictions by positing the infinite as homonymous, applying analogously to time, motion, number, and magnitude divisibility. Aristotle’s ‘infinite in potency’ accommodates diverse interpretations – capacity for divisibility and process for time – unifying them through matter as their foundation. This approach untangles dialectical impasses, aligns with observed properties, and explains Aristotle’s predecessors’ varied positions. Recognizing the infinite’s analogous nature resolves scholarly disputes, while affirming its grounding in a material as subject to continuous quantity.

In this article, I address the debated and long-standing question of what the principle of individuation in Aristotle’s philosophy is. My claim is that individuation does not have a single principle or cause but is a process that has a threefold cause: a certain form, a certain matter, and a certain mover. My overall argument unfolds in four stages: firstly, I briefly summarize the debate on this issue and provide some clarifications on terminology. Next, I show what the critical issues are in taking form or matter as the only principles of individuation. Thirdly, I state my thesis on the triple causality of individuation in Aristotle, arguing on the basis of a passage from Metaphysics Λ 5. Fourthly and lastly, I examine the generation of animals as a process of individuation, to show that the three causes of individuation illustrated by the Metaphysics are also found in the zoological studies. This convergence of causes makes it possible to give an answer to the quarrel over individuation and to interpret it as a process that is marked by accident and not by teleology.

To this day, Aristotle’s logical works are often referred to as the Organon . It is well known that this means the ‘instrument,’ or the ‘tool.’ However, the exact arguments Aristotle’s commentators used to justify the instrumental status of logic are less known. This study provides a systematic examination of the arguments that defend the idea that logic is an instrument of philosophy rather than a part, as they are found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius Hermiae, Philoponus, Elias, David and Olympiodorus. After analyzing these arguments, I argue that they make most sense when put into the broader context of the commentators’ conception of philosophy. Thus, I show that the debate about whether logic is an instrument or a part of philosophy is not primarily a debate about the role of logic; it is primarily a debate about what philosophy is.

In this paper, I argue that Simplicius’ prologue to his Commentary on the Physics constitutes a deliberate response to the criticisms Proclus directed at Aristotelian physiologia in the prologue to his Commentary on the Timaeus . In the first part of the paper, I examine three main critiques raised by Proclus against Aristotle: (1) Aristotle’s physiologia is inferior to that of Plato because it does not account for the true and higher causes; (2) Aristotle was an imitator of Plato; and (3) Aristotle’s conception of nature is inadequate. In the second part, I show how Simplicius offers precise responses to each of these critiques. For Simplicius, Aristotle’s physiologia , no less than Plato’s, serves as a path to theologia . More than that, he holds that Aristotle surpasses his teacher Plato in five key respects. Aristotle’s superiority is primarily didactic: his greater clarity and precision ensure that those embarking on the philosophical path are not led astray. This is particularly significant for Simplicius, who writes in a time of profound crisis for paganism. Finally, I underline how Simplicius, unlike Proclus, believes that a defense of paganism can only be effective if Aristotle is included – without exception – alongside Plato as a guide for both pagan philosophy and religion.

In this paper, I set out to analyse a peculiar testimony, preserved by Nonius Marcellus and stemming from a lost Menippean satire by Varro, in which Democritus and Heraclides Ponticus are paired because of their alleged views on funerary practices, that is, on how one should dispose of the bodies of the dead. In the first place, I shall argue that this account should not be attributed to Heraclides, but to Heraclitus, and that the text should thus be added to our collections of Heraclitean testimonies. Heraclitus would have indeed claimed that the bodies of the deceased should be burnt; Democritus, conversely, that they ought to be preserved in honey. In the second place, I shall contextualise this testimony, thanks to parallel sources, in order to enquire into the origins of the two opinions presented there, which cannot be deemed to be authentic. I will point to the centrality of the Hellenistic tradition, namely to the importance both of the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus and of Stoic-Academic debates, mainly on perception. In doing so, we might catch a glimpse of the mysterious origin of the famous duo Democritus-Heraclitus.

In this note I focus on a controversial passage of APr. II 22 where Aristotle allegedly claimed that two terms A and B convert without the latter being predicated of the former. The passage is controversial given Aristotle’s endorsement in APr. II 5 of quite the opposite view, namely that converting terms are predicated of each other. I provide an interpretation of the final clause πλὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ A at 68a21 which is consistent with the idea that B is predicated of A. Then, I attempt a reconstruction of the argument in order to show that Aristotle was indeed committed to the claim that B is predicated of A , hence the two terms convert precisely in the sense of APr. II 5. Such a reconstruction, unlike the one provided by the consensus view, does not presuppose at all the orthodox dictum (in fact, it is arguably neutral with respect to which semantics for assertoric syllogistic is adopted). Besides being closer to Aristotle’s text, the reconstruction has the advantage that it can be endorsed even by those who do accept the heterodox interpretation of the dictum .

Julian’s hymn To the Mother of the Gods is a key text for understanding the emperor’s philosophical-religious thought and his political strategy to revive paganism in the 4th century. Long dismissed by Neoplatonist scholars as disjointed and obscure, this complex work has recently undergone significant scholarly reappraisal. Michael Schramm’s 2025 volume Kaiser Julian, Auf die Göttermutter (De Gruyter, 2025), featuring a critical edition, new German translation, and commentary, finally accords this important text the attention it merits. Schramm uncovers remarkable structural coherence in a work supposedly composed in a single night. The hymn’s three carefully crafted sections – analyzing myth, theology, and ritual practice – serve both protreptic and apologetic functions. Julian strategically juxtaposes Cybele-Attis worship with Christian doctrine (particularly the Christ/Virgin narrative), addressing educated audiences across religious divides. More than personal devotion, the work constitutes a calculated political statement affirming classical religion’s enduring vitality. Schramm’s commentary excels through its interdisciplinary rigor. My analysis highlights three groundbreaking contributions: tracing Julian’s intellectual debt to Iamblichus, situating the hymn within Julian’s broader corpus, and revealing its systematic anti-Christian subtext. Together, these approaches demonstrate how Julian synthesized philosophical argumentation and religious polemic during this pivotal historical moment.