Volume 45, Issue 2

Can everyone be wise? Is wisdom open to all or an exception reserved for a few, or perhaps for none? In this context, what is the role of the ‘example’ and the ‘imitation’? Aim of my paper is to reflect on these questions in reference to Ancient Cynicism. Specifically, my goal is to analyze whether the Cynic wisdom and, consequently, life ( bios ) – characterized by a complete opposition to that of the common man – was intended for everyone or only for exceptional individuals, for specific types of people. In examining this aspect, I will focus particularly on the example represented by the life of the first Cynic, Diogenes of Sinope. I will show how it has been differently interpreted and understood throughout the long history of Cynicism. My attention will be primarily on Onesicritus of Astypalaea, who, contrary to certain modern simplifications and negations, represents a very interesting case in the history of Cynicism. He was a Cynic who did not live cynically. Therefore, more generally, I will demonstrate how differently Cynic philosophy could not only be followed but also reinterpreted: another sign of the theoretical fertility of this philosophical movement.

In this paper I show that Aristotle’s widely criticised exclusion of Platonic efficient causes at Metaph . A 6.988a7–17 is defensible as an interpretation of Plato, and that alternative accounts are unpersuasive. I argue that Aristotle is only interested in – what he supposes to be – Plato’s first principles and that the usual candidates that are brought forward in scholarship as possible first principles and efficient causes (e.g. from the Timaeus and the Philebus ) all fall short in crucial respects according to Aristotle. This reading has the dual benefit of illuminating Aristotle’s strategy in book A and of letting him appear as a more trustworthy doxographer of his predecessors’ views.

Aristotle’s classification of ideal number in Metaphysics M 6 has often been considered an unfair presentation of Plato’s actual views. I take another look at the passage and argue that Aristotle is a more careful critic than has been usually recognised. In particular, I argue that much of the scholarly discussion on the passage has failed to take account of Aristotle’s deeper concern, namely, the conditions necessary for numbers to be ordinal. I then set Aristotle’s critique within the broader context of his concern to separate Form from Number, and thus to separate metaphysical questions from mathematical ones. The latter half of the article shows some of the consequences of mixing mathematics with metaphysics from a systematic and historical point of view.

This paper discusses the debate regarding the terms makarios (“blessed”) and eudaimon (“happy”) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . In it, I identify two scholarly conclusions regarding these terms: (1) the distinction thesis: that the words mean different things in the text, and (2) the interchangeability thesis: that the words do not mean different things in the text, and may be substituted for one another. I argue that the theories should both be used as heuristic tools of analysis, rather than only one of them being used as a universal rule to be applied to the text. Additionally, I argue that a third heuristic device is needed: I forward that while makarios and eudaimon are sometimes interchangeable (contra the distinction thesis) they are not synonymous (contra the interchangeability thesis). Rather, in some cases, both terms can be translated as “happy,” but they are being used by Aristotle in reference to subjects with distinct natures. In these instances, eudaimonia can sometimes be interpreted as a properly human term, which we cannot apply to the gods. Or, if it is applied to the gods, it must be applied in a distinct, qualified way. Meanwhile, makarios can sometimes be interpreted as a properly divine term, used in reference to the gods or to a god-like status achieved by a human being who has superseded normal human achievement or capacity.

The aim of this paper, which is devoted to the Proclean Commentary on the Alcibiades I , is to explain not only why this dialogue is so popular in Neoplatonism, i.e. why it is considered the foundation of Plato’s teaching, but also its methodological importance for reading the proems of the dialogues. For, in my opinion, it has not yet been properly investigated whether and why the two issues, i.e. the introductory importance and the importance for grasping the relevance of the proems, are closely linked. I will therefore first try to show how the isagogical questions are perfectly embedded in a philosophical system that has redefined the very criteria of textual analysis around the idea that each dialogue is a literary microcosm analogous to the macrocosmic universe. I will then show how the exegetical methods proposed by Proclus in his Commentary on the Alcibiades are influenced by certain theoretical assumptions that are useful for reading the dialogues in general, and finally I will demonstrate how the proem of the Alcibiades allows us to re-evaluate the importance of the proems that Plato appended to his writings.

The first translations of Philo into the Italian vernacular date back to the second half of the 16th century and took place in Venice. The cosmopolitan and flourishing Venetian environment plays a fundamental role in the Mediterranean and European economy and is at the center of a network of international relationships. The city is a center of attraction for intellectuals and artists and the book business is experiencing great development there. The Venetian translations of Philo constitute an interesting mirror of different positions, more or less linked to reformed theses or to the Church of Rome. They are conducted over a period of twenty-six years (1548–1574), a period in which we witness profound changes in the relations between Rome and Venice. Philo seems to be able to constitute a mirror and perhaps an instrument of such changes. In the lively climate of the ‘Serenissima’, crossed by reformist and counter-reformist impulses, where cultural openness is expressed in publications, literary meetings, cenacles, academies, confraternities and where the vernacular version of ancient works has a certain diffusion, Philo is used with in different ways by representatives of different trends. The very fact that his work is translated takes on a meaning that is not only erudite and, probably, the date of the individual translations is significant: Ballino is closer to Erasmian positions, Ferentilli is more linked to the Church of Rome, Zini is more nuanced and probably changes his positions with the passing of years and events.

A passage from Michael of Ephesus’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics , book V (p. 50, 6–10 Hayduck), gives some information on the Anonymous Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics , books II–IV. Michael cites a series of ancient annotations to the third book, written by ancient exegetes and which have come down to him. It can therefore be assumed that Michael had the Anonymous Commentary in front of him when he wrote these lines. It is thus possible to assume that it was Michael of Ephesus himself who organised the entire commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and inserted the Anonymous Commentary on Books II-IV after Eustratius’ commentary on Book I and before his own commentary on Book V.