Band 68, Heft 6

Critics have standardly regarded Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason as an abortive attempt to overcome the subjectivist individualism of his early philosophy, motivated by a recognition that Being and Nothingness lacks ethical and political significance, but derailed by Sartre’s Marxism. In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Critique which, if correct, shows it to offer a coherent and highly original account of social and political reality, which merits attention both in its own right and as a reconstruction of the philosophical foundation of Marxism. The key to Sartre’s theory of collective and historical existence in the Critique is a thesis carried over from Being and Nothingness : intersubjectivity on Sartre’s account is inherently aporetic, and social ontology reproduces in magnified form its limited intelligibility, lack of transparency, and necessary frustration of the demands of freedom. Sartre’s further conjecture – which can be formulated a priori but requires a posteriori verification – is that man’s collective historical existence may be understood as the means by which the antinomy within human freedom, insoluble at the level of the individual, is finally overcome. The Critique provides therefore the ethical theory promised in Being and Nothingness .

The state of recent as well as older research on social ontology suggests a paradigmatic approach, according to which it is our consciousness that must provide the framework for conceptualising the social. I, however, argue that Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule-following opens up a new horizon for the ontology of the social. The fact that the rules of our language are social in nature and that we need not be aware of them in order to follow them shifts the problem to what lies behind consciousness. The ontological conceptualisation of the social must focus on our implicit knowledge instead, which is always an enabling condition for our consciousness: for we share some of this implicit knowledge with others, as can be seen from Wittgenstein and the case of language.

This paper sets out the notion of a current “biopolitical turn of digital capitalism” resulting from the increasing deployment of AI and data analytics technologies in the public sector. With applications of AI-based automated decisions currently shifting from the domain of business to customer (B2C) relations to government to citizen (G2C) relations, a new form of governance arises that operates through “algorithmic social selection”. Moreover, the paper describes how the ethics of AI is at an impasse concerning these larger societal and socioeconomic trends and calls for an ethics of AI that includes, and acts in close alliance with, social and political philosophy. As an example, the problem of Predictive Analytics is debated to make the point that data-driven AI (Machine Learning) is currently one of the main ethical challenges in the ethics of AI.

This article starts by critically engaging with exclusion within the hegemonic European philosophical discourses based on racist and civilisational narratives both during the colonial past and in the present. As a counter-strategy, it rejects any defence of peripheral cultures based on particularist narratives or essentialising identities. In this light, it critically discusses the project of ethnophilosophy in the African context. The author defines relativism as a trap that imprisons postcolonial subjects rather than truly liberating them. The project of universalism is neither European nor Eurocentric, but universal in scope, since intellectuals in all cultures make truth-claims. Accordingly, it pleads for conceptualising the universal not as a given that can be embraced or rejected, but as a goal and an infinite horizon that all cultures of the world should work on together.

This essay examines Fatima Mernissi’s and Mohammed Arkoun’s strategies of rereading central texts of the classical Islamic tradition in order to develop a contemporary normative grammar of critique. Mernissi reconsiders marginalized intellectuals and theoretical schools of Islamic history and derives immanent principles of justice. From a feminist perspective, she criticizes the dominantly patriarchal interpretations of Islamic foundational texts. Taking the classical humanism of Miskawayh as a point of departure, Arkoun carves out his conception of justice. Based on both Islamic religious ethics and antique Greek philosophy, he develops a transcultural humanism. Methodologically, Arkoun suggests a deconstructive examination of the classical Islamic texts to free Islamic thought from orthodox strictures. By way of conclusion, the article suggests that Mernissi’s and Arkoun’s progressive interpretation of the classical Islamic heritage may help to overcome the narrow, identitarian understanding of Islamic thought prevalent in both Muslim and Western societies.

This article investigates the concept of Ubuntu/Botho as a possible foundation for an African moral theory. It departs from an analysis of the idea of “human personhood” as a basis for moral agency, which is controversially debated within African philosophy. This notion of personhood relies on an understanding of the mutual interdependence of human beings. As a next step, the author critically assesses the discursive function of Ubuntu/Botho in African societies and its misuse by political elites as ideological cover for exclusionary and violent practices. By way of conclusion, the article stresses restoration as a key value associated with African humanism based on Ubuntu/Botho.

When ‘we’ in the West talk about philosophy, we most often mean ‘Western Philosophy’, i. e. philosophy with ancient roots in Greece from the pre-Socratic period onwards until today, thereby neglecting other cultures and traditions, whose history of philosophical thinking is at least as old and important. This neglect of other philosophical traditions is a problem in general, since it is unfair, hegemonic, ignorant, and imprudent. The article argues that there are instrumental as well as intrinsic reasons to diversify and globalize the philosophical canon. Different philosophical traditions should engage more substantially with each other to solve philosophical problems. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look beyond our respective cultural traditions to improve on our current approach of solving philosophical problems by our own lights.