Band 68, Heft 5

“What we call meaning is bound to vanish”: Under this heading, an interview with Max Horkheimer was published in Der Spiegel (Jan 5, 1970). Revisiting this interview, the article focuses on Horkheimer’s thesis that human beings share the “longing that the injustice which characterizes the world must not be the final word”. It examines the extent to which Horkheimer’s notion of the “desire for the totally other” may be inspired by Kant’s claim that religion is grounded in the “need of practical reason”. A further topic of discussion is Horkheimer’s critical assessment concerning current tendencies toward a “total administration of the world” that may ultimately “reduce thinking to the level of industrial processes”. Relating this critique to Kant’s reflections on the “unbelief of reason (Vernunftunglaube)”, which is based on “the maxim of reason’s independence of its own need”, the article raises the question of Horkheimer’s significance today: What relevance does Horkheimer’s method of casting doubt on any “politics that is not based on theology, metaphysics and, of course, morality” have for today’s discourse on such matters? In this context a brief glance is cast at Jürgen Habermas’s post-metaphysical reading of Horkheimer’s “negative theology”. Die Forschung zu diesem Beitrag wurde durch das Russian Academic Excellence Project at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Aleksandra Nevskogo Street 14, 236016 Kaliningrad, Russische Föderation) unterstützt.

Intuition-based argumentation is ubiquitous across most philosophical subfields. Moral and political philosophers in particular frequently justify normative principles on the basis of thought experiments that evoke judgments about specific (hypothetical) cases. Lately, however, intuitions have come under attack and their justificatory force is being questioned. This essay asks whether we can acknowledge the epistemic fallibility of intuitions, while nevertheless reaching reliable normative conclusions. To that effect I investigate three different strategies of relating specific intuitions and more general normative principles: the intuitionist, coherentist, and foundationalist methods. Showing that none of them succeeds in making up for the problematic epistemic status of intuitions in the justificatory process, I conclude that normative principles are unreliable to the extent that they are based on thought-experiments.

In this paper, I delineate the first pages of a philosophical genealogy which outlines the cornerstones of a philosophy of bio-technical forms. In so doing, the essay contributes to the philosophical understanding of some key scientific concepts. In particular, it analyses the philosophical and historical preconditions, the epistemic assumptions, as well as the ontological commitments of the concept of form as used in digital design and in bionics. In the first section, I investigate Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technical forms. In the second section, I analyse the emergence of biotechnology, today’s bionics, as an independent technical discipline. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Austro-Hungarian botanist Raoul Heinrich Francé (1874–1943) founded this discipline with the aim of imitating the technical solutions chosen by nature. In the conclusion, I draw broader conclusions about the philosophy of bio-technical forms. Particularly, I argue, first, that the role of materiality and form-intrinsic propriety is of central importance in processes of form design. Second, I define morphology as a theory of possible constructions of forms in space and not, as in evolutionary biology, a science of the changes of forms in time. This characterises what I have called the ontological turn in form-design disciplines: nature operates technically to conceive new forms.

Mechanistic explanations – especially mechanistic models – are commonly used to describe living beings. But their usage should be scrutinised closely. This text elucidates the motives, conditions and implications of a so called ‘methodical mechanism’. Due to the fact that humans cannot properly explain certain biotic processes, they have to rely on their technical knowledge to explain them. The history of philosophy and scientific thinking is, therefore, intertwined with the history of technology: the way humans interpret and explain natural phenomena is subject to the technological knowledge of a given time. The danger of this mechanistic approach, however, is that it can lead to false ontological assumptions about nature and humankind’s place therein, resulting in a subjugation of natural processes to instrumental reason.

Inspired by the success of synthesising organic substances by Friedrich Wöhler in 1828, the vision of creating life in the laboratory synthetically has become increasingly accessible for today’s synthetic biology and synthetic genomics, respectively. The engineering of biology – a contemporary version of the liaison of technology and organic form – creates cellular machines, biobricks, biomolecular ‘borgs’, and entire synthetic genomes of artificial organisms. Besides major ethical concerns, the shift in scientific epistemology is of interest. Unlike classical analytical science, synthetic science understands by a process of generation, through which myriads of new things are created, dramatically changing the living environment.

Evolution seems tobe a perfect example of a historical process: It began with the earliest “living” units, progressed to massive diversity and disparity, and resulted in our recent lifeworld, the subject-matter of the evolutionary biologist. Yet some irritation remains considering the logical grammar of “history”, as it seems to introduce non-functional aspects into evolutionary theory – which is often addressed as contingency in evolutionary biology . But even reducing the “historical” aspect of evolutionary biology to a functional understanding of lifeworld, we have to consider the specific historicity of the epistemic situation of the evolutionary biologist. This paper argues for the relevance of the explication of this peculiar epistemic situation, taking into account the recent systemic transformations of evolutionary theory. The argument is developed in three steps: first, a revision of the use of temporal expressions in (bio-)sciences, revealing the prevalence of a non-modal understanding of time, which leads to “thin” temporal characterizations of biological processes. Second, based upon biology’s shift toward system paradigms, the formal structure of recent evolutionary approaches is shown to result in a “loss of historicity”. Finally, the consequences for the self-understanding of humans as evolutionary lifeforms are explicated. This reconstruction of the difference between historical and evolutionary judgment emphasizes the relevance of the modal aspects of temporality, which is demonstrated by considering a significant shift of the underlying temporal frames. Accordingly to human beings as historical entities, the differences between natural history, prehistory and history proper are relocated within the concept of history itself.