Home Zum Status von Intuitionen in Gedankenexperimenten
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Zum Status von Intuitionen in Gedankenexperimenten

  • Jakob Huber EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: December 9, 2020

Abstract

Intuition-based argumentation is ubiquitous across most philosophical subfields. Moral and political philosophers in particular frequently justify normative principles on the basis of thought experiments that evoke judgments about specific (hypothetical) cases. Lately, however, intuitions have come under attack and their justificatory force is being questioned. This essay asks whether we can acknowledge the epistemic fallibility of intuitions, while nevertheless reaching reliable normative conclusions. To that effect I investigate three different strategies of relating specific intuitions and more general normative principles: the intuitionist, coherentist, and foundationalist methods. Showing that none of them succeeds in making up for the problematic epistemic status of intuitions in the justificatory process, I conclude that normative principles are unreliable to the extent that they are based on thought-experiments.

Literatur

Bertram, G. (2018), Philosophische Gedankenexperimente – Ein Lese- und Studienbuch, Stuttgart.Search in Google Scholar

Bojanowski, J. (2006), Kants Theorie der Freiheit: Rekonstruktion und Rehabilitierung, Berlin.10.1515/9783110909906Search in Google Scholar

Brownlee, K., u. Stemplowska, Z. (2011), Trapped in an Experience Machine with a Famous Violinist: Thought Experiments in Normative Theory, in: Blau, A. (Hg.), Methods in Analytical Political Theory, Cambridge, 21–46.10.1017/9781316162576.004Search in Google Scholar

Cappelen, H. (2012), Philosophy Without Intuitions, Oxford.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Daniels, N. (2013), Reflective Equilibrium, in: Zalta, E. (Hg.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter Edition, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ (15.9.2020).Search in Google Scholar

Dennett, D. (2013), Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, New York.Search in Google Scholar

McDermott, D. (2008), Analytical Political Philosophy, in: Leopold, D., u. Stears, M. (Hg.), Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, Oxford, 11–29.Search in Google Scholar

Elster, J. (2011), How Outlandish can Imaginary Cases be?, in: Journal of Applied Philosophy 28.3, 241–258.10.1111/j.1468-5930.2011.00531.xSearch in Google Scholar

Gendler, T. (2007), Philosophical Thought-Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium, in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31, 68–89.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0007Search in Google Scholar

Gettier, E. (1963), Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, in: Analysis 23.6, 121–123.10.1093/analys/23.6.121Search in Google Scholar

Grundmann, T. (2007), The Nature of Rational Intuition and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 74, 69–87.10.1163/9789401204651_005Search in Google Scholar

Grundmann, T., et al. (Hg.) (2014), Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion, Frankfurt am Main.Search in Google Scholar

Höffe, O. (2010), Einführung, in: ders. (Hg.), John Rawls: Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Berlin, 1–25.Search in Google Scholar

List, C., u. Valentini, L. (2016), The Methodology of Political Theory, in: Cappelen, H., et al. (Hg.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford, 525–553.10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.10Search in Google Scholar

Kant, I. (2003), Kritik der praktischen Vernunft [1781], Hamburg.10.28937/978-3-7873-2118-6Search in Google Scholar

McMahan, J. (2015), Moral Intuitions, in: LaFollette, H., u. Persson, I. (Hg.), Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Oxford, 103–123.10.1111/b.9780631201199.1999.00007.xSearch in Google Scholar

Nichols, S., et al. (2003), Metaskepticism. Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology, in: Luper, S. (Hg.), The Skeptics, Ashgate, 227–247.Search in Google Scholar

Rossi, E., u. Sleat, M. (2014), Realism in Normative Political Theory, in: Philosophy Compass 9.10, 689–701.10.1111/phc3.12148Search in Google Scholar

Thomson, J. (1985), The Trolley Problem, in: The Yale Law Journal 94, 1395–1415.10.2307/796133Search in Google Scholar

Pust, J. (2014), Intuition, in: Zalta, E. (Hg.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall Edition, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/intuition/ (15.9.2020).Search in Google Scholar

Quine, W. V. O. (1951), Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in: The Philosophical Review 60, 20–43.10.2307/2181906Search in Google Scholar

Quine, W. V. O. (1975), On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World, in: Erkenntnis 9.3, 313–328.10.2307/j.ctv1n1bsg1.20Search in Google Scholar

Van Fraassen, B. (1980), The Scientific Image, Oxford.10.1093/0198244274.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Rawls, J. (1975), Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt am Main.Search in Google Scholar

Rawls, J. (2006), Gerechtigkeit als Fairness, Frankfurt am Main.Search in Google Scholar

Sayre-McCord, G. (1996), Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory, in: Sinnott-Armstrong, W., u. Timmons, M. (Hg.), Moral Knowledge?, New York, 137–189.Search in Google Scholar

Sidgwick, H. (1907), The Methods of Ethics, London.Search in Google Scholar

Singer, P. (1974), Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium, in: The Monist 58, 490–517.10.5840/monist197458330Search in Google Scholar

Vorhoeve, A. (2009), Conversations in Ethics, Oxford.10.1093/oso/9780199215379.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Weinberg, J., et al. (2014), Normativität und epistemische Intuitionen, in: Grundmann (2014), 55–96.Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2020-12-09
Published in Print: 2020-12-16

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 12.10.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/dzph-2020-0047/html
Scroll to top button