Volume 60, Issue 6 -

Two conceptions of language have dominated philosophical reflection over the last century on the nature of language and linguistic understanding. The first is the calculus conception, advanced in various forms by Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Dummett and Davidson. The second is the anthropological conception of language advanced in various forms by the later Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Grice. The purpose of the paper is to compare and contrast the two conceptions. The calculus conception assigns priority to the notions of truth and truth-condition, and to the assertoric mode. The anthropological conception assigns priority to use, meaning and explanations of meaning, and is indifferent to mode. The disagreements between the two conceptions are explored, and the further consequences of each conception are described.

The state of nature is a fundamental concept of modern political philosophy. As such, it is particularly associated with Thomas Hobbes’ and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work. As the following article shows, the state of nature is not simply an auxiliary construction [Hilfskonstruktion] for a theory that aims to clarify the relation between the political order and its origins and normative principles. It is also a figure of thought that introduces colonial images into political philosophy. The following reading of Hobbes and Rousseau, which also draws on image analysis, traces how their conceptions of the state of nature are constitutively linked to imaginations of the savage that emanate from contemporary colonial discourses. Moreover, by comparing the writings of Hobbes and Rousseau it becomes apparent that the colonial difference increasingly takes on a systematic relevance. This development further contains significant similarities with the changing use of gender differences in political philosophy.

Current phenomenological approaches consider schizophrenia as a fundamental disturbance of the embodied self, or a disembodiment . This includes (1) a weakening of the basic sense of self, (2) a disruption of implicit bodily functioning, and (3) a disconnection from the intercorporality with others. As a result of this disembodiment, the pre-reflective, practical immersion of the self in the shared world is lost. Instead, the relationship of self and world is in constant need of reconstruction by deliberate efforts, leading to the growing perplexity and hyperreflexive ruminations that are found in schizophrenic patients. The paper distinguishes different levels of self-experience and relates it to the psychopathology of schizophrenia.

This paper explores the two-factor theoretical model currently widely used to provide an explanatory analysis of the delusions that regularly accompany neurological disease or damage. The model hypothesizes a combination of an experiential factor – a strange or untoward experience – and a cognitive factor, such as an impairment of reasoning. The two-factor model has been devised for monothematic delusions that are usually manifested in a single, implausible idea. These have to be distinguished from the more elaborated, polythematic delusions that are found in psychiatry. Psychiatric delusions exceed neurological ones in frequency and, often, semantic complexity. This text offers a preliminary clarification of underlying assumptions about the breadth, terminology and presuppositions of two-factor theorizing, exploring its potential application to psychiatric delusions.

We develop a philosophical interpretation of altered experience in conditions of severe unipolar depression. Drawing on phenomenological analysis, on published depression memoires and on a recent questionnaire study with patients in Britain, we hold that depression is a profound impairment of agency. Its experiential core consists in a paralyzing loss of drive and energy, a suspension of initiative, an inability to adopt a stance and act in accordance with it. Moreover, we show that experiences such as a loss of self and world, altered interpersonal relatedness, modified corporeal experience as well as marked changes in the experience of time go along with the loss of agency. In order to assess their broader philosophical significance, we relate our analyses to an almost forgotten philosophical discussion: that of the term Selbstgefühl (“self feeling”) in 19th century German philosophy and early psychiatry. We also briefly discuss recent debates about the alleged historical and cultural specificity of depression.

Cognitive Theory (CT) is widely acknowledged framework used to understand the psychological processes involved in affective disorders and to conceptualize the adequate psychotherapy. The purpose of this paper is to assess the philosophical assumptions that CT rests upon. It will be argued that CT must be revised due to significant flaws in many of these philosophical assumptions. The last part of the paper will contain suggestions as to how these problems could be overcome in a manner that would secure philosophical coherence, while also providing an account that is better suited to explaining some of the cognitive, emotional and bodily manifestations of affective disorders.

Does the reference to a mental realm in using the notion of mental disorder lead to a dilemma that consists in either implying a Cartesian account of the mind-body relation or in the need to give up a notion of mental disorder in its own right? Many psychiatrists seem to believe that denying substance dualism requires a purely neurophysiological stance for explaining mental disorder. However, this conviction is based on a limited awareness of the philosophical debate on the mind-body problem. This article discusses the reasonableness of the concept of mental disorder in relation to reductionist and eliminativist strategies in the philosophy of mind. It is concluded that we need a psychological level of explanation that cannot be reduced to neurophysiological findings in order to make sense of mental disorder.

Looking back onto 50 years of teaching and research, Herbert Schnädelbach describes factors that shaped the development of philosophy during these years, leading foremost to a scientification of philosophy and to a specialization of philosophers. Simultaneously, he makes the diagnosis of a transformation from a personalized interpretation and explanation discipline to a cooperative effort, distinguished more by an increased interest in systemic questions and cooperation than by irreconcilable frontline positioning. The influence of the university reforms of the 1960s and of the years from 2000 onwards, how he relates to Kant, Hegel, and Adorno and to the role of the Critical Theory are also subject matters of the interview, as are questions regarding the tasks of philosophy in modern society.

This paper critically analyses two of Eckart Förster’s claims on the development of German idealism. The first claim is the following: In his writings on colour and on plant development, Goethe uses a method that is grounded in Spinoza’s third form of knowledge, scientia intuitiva. According to the second claim, Goethe’s methodology played a crucial role in establishing a developmental approach to knowledge in Hegel’s early Jena period. The paper assesses objections to both claims.

The discussion of the hermetical §§ 76/77 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is the centerpiece of Eckart Förster’s groundbreaking Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie . The decisive methodological tool employed by Kant in those sections is the use of limiting concepts such as intellectual intuition and intuitive intellect. Förster’s discussion of the use of limiting concepts in those paragraphs is outlined and ultimately – despite some criticism in exegetical detail – assessed as the right way to reconstruct the intricate argument of those important sections.

Förster’s interpretation of the concept of intuitive understandung in Goethe is discussed with respect to the apprehension of transitions ( Übergänge ) in the phenomenon. Such intuition is both receptive ( anschauend ) und formative ( bildend ). Goethe’s theory of intuitive understanding proves to be an account of intentional content as a becoming-identical with the object as regard to its form.

Against Kant, Eckart Förster claims that Goethe’s methodology of intuitive understanding is a real possibility for us. Firstly, this essay shows that this methodology has to be strictly distinguished from the questionable use of intuitions in contemporary analytic philosophy; secondly, strong parallels between Goethe’s intuitive understanding and Bergson’s intuition are put forward. Both use intuitions as a tool to find essence concepts for natural kinds. Moreover, the parallels help naturalists (like me) to detach Förster’s important insight from the idealistic context.

Zusammenfassung Manfred Frank: Ansichten der Subjektivität. Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin 2012, 420 S.

Zusammenfassung Thomas Pogge: Weltarmut und Menschenrechte. Kosmopolitische Verantwortung und Reformen. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2011, 389 S.

Zusammenfassung Herbert Schnädelbach: Was Philosophen wissen und was man von ihnen lernen kann. C.H. Beck Verlag, München 2012, 237 S.

Zusammenfassung Maria-Sibylla Lotter: Scham, Schuld, Verantwortung. Über die kulturellen Grundlagen der Moral. Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin 2012, 344 S.