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R&D Subsidies and the Surplus Appropriability Problem

  • Anders Sørensen
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 4. August 2006

It may be optimal from a welfare perspective to use R&D subsidies when the source of R&D distortions originates from the surplus appropriability problem and technological spillovers in the form of knowledge spillovers, creative destruction, and duplication externalities are absent. Hence, R&D subsidies may constitute the welfare maximizing policy even when subsidies directly targeted on monopoly pricing could be applied. The result holds when dynamic gains are important relative to static gains and when government spending is restricted, i.e., below the required effort for correcting completely for market failures. The argument is developed in a semi-endogenous growth model where the only distortion is monopoly pricing of intermediate goods.

Published Online: 2006-8-4

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Heruntergeladen am 31.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1534-5998.1346/html?lang=de
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