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Rating Agencies and Sovereign Debt Rollover

  • Mark Carlson und Galina B Hale
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 13. September 2006

In order to explore how credit ratings may affect financial markets, we analyze a global game model of debt roll-over in which heterogeneous investors act strategically. We find that the addition of the rating agency has a non-monotonic effect on the probability of default and the magnitude of the response of capital flows to changes in fundamentals. We also establish that introducing a rating agency can bring multiple equilibria to a market that otherwise would have a unique equilibrium.

Published Online: 2006-9-13

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 25.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1534-5998.1375/html
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