The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription
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Finn Spicer
Abstract
In this paper a new theory is offered of the concepts we use to think about thought-content in propositional attitude ascriptions – the Paratactic Account. According to the Paratactic Account, in a propositional attitude ascription a person is described as standing in an attitudinal relation to a representational entity – a content. In making a propositional attitude ascription, then, one refers to a content; according to the Paratactic Account, one does this by using a demonstrative concept, which demonstrates a tokening of the target content in one’s own thinking. The Paratactic Account is offered as a competitor to Peacocke’s Redeployment View, and to Russellian and Fregean accounts of the concepts used in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is defended as a superior account to these rivals in its capacity to explain subjects’ folk-psychological abilities and their intuitions about the correctness of propositional attitude reports. Keywords: propositional attitude ascription; representations; folk psychology; propositional attitude reports
Abstract
In this paper a new theory is offered of the concepts we use to think about thought-content in propositional attitude ascriptions – the Paratactic Account. According to the Paratactic Account, in a propositional attitude ascription a person is described as standing in an attitudinal relation to a representational entity – a content. In making a propositional attitude ascription, then, one refers to a content; according to the Paratactic Account, one does this by using a demonstrative concept, which demonstrates a tokening of the target content in one’s own thinking. The Paratactic Account is offered as a competitor to Peacocke’s Redeployment View, and to Russellian and Fregean accounts of the concepts used in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is defended as a superior account to these rivals in its capacity to explain subjects’ folk-psychological abilities and their intuitions about the correctness of propositional attitude reports. Keywords: propositional attitude ascription; representations; folk psychology; propositional attitude reports
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
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Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
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Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
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Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
-
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
-
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
-
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
