The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action
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Nivedita Gangopadhyay
Abstract
The extended mind hypothesis (EM) (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I discuss the support waiting for EM in social cognition, particularly in some cases of embodied intersubjective interactions or action-understanding. A main claim to be defended by way of defending EM is the elimination of the boundary between perception and action (Chalmers 2008). I explore the possibility that embodied intersubjectivity may supply the much needed interdependence of perception and action required to ground a robust EM. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for EM in embodied intersubjective interactions, namely, simulation theory (ST) and a perceptual account (PT). However, using the support from embodied intersubjectivity requires EM to abandon two cornerstones of Clark’s philosophical framework, namely, representationalism and the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action. I argue that if EM adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a perceptual account of action-understanding it relies on an action-oriented account of perception hitherto criticised by Clark. Keywords: extended mind; perception-action interdependence; simulation theory; perceptual theory; embodied intersubjectivity
Abstract
The extended mind hypothesis (EM) (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I discuss the support waiting for EM in social cognition, particularly in some cases of embodied intersubjective interactions or action-understanding. A main claim to be defended by way of defending EM is the elimination of the boundary between perception and action (Chalmers 2008). I explore the possibility that embodied intersubjectivity may supply the much needed interdependence of perception and action required to ground a robust EM. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for EM in embodied intersubjective interactions, namely, simulation theory (ST) and a perceptual account (PT). However, using the support from embodied intersubjectivity requires EM to abandon two cornerstones of Clark’s philosophical framework, namely, representationalism and the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action. I argue that if EM adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a perceptual account of action-understanding it relies on an action-oriented account of perception hitherto criticised by Clark. Keywords: extended mind; perception-action interdependence; simulation theory; perceptual theory; embodied intersubjectivity
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
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Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
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Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
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Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
-
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
-
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
-
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
