Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface?
-
Bryony Pierce
Abstract
The mind-body problem – how conscious experience can arise from a physical system – is commonly taken to be the problem of how phenomenal properties could come to accompany psychological or behavioural functions, which, being functional and attainable by non-conscious entities in virtue of their physical features, are not viewed as part of the ‘hard problem’. This implies that there is a relation between the system constituted by the physical body negotiating the external world on the one hand, and conscious experience on the other, in which psychological features, such as beliefs and desires leading to action, are situated, conceptually and functionally, somewhere between these two realms. The alternative approach I will discuss takes the view that conscious experience, rather than being conceptualised as one step beyond psychological functions, in relation to the physical self, should be situated at the interface between the physical body and cognitive processes. Work in the field of experimental psychology, by Balleine and Dickinson (1998), provides empirical evidence consistent with this view. Dickinson and Balleine’s hypothesis is that the function of consciousness is to act as an interface, providing a means of interaction between bodily states and affordances in the external world, enabling rational, goal-directed action. My philosophical work on grounding rationality draws the same conclusion, providing support for Dickinson’s interface theory, Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT). Keywords: interface theory; consciousness; goal-directed action
Abstract
The mind-body problem – how conscious experience can arise from a physical system – is commonly taken to be the problem of how phenomenal properties could come to accompany psychological or behavioural functions, which, being functional and attainable by non-conscious entities in virtue of their physical features, are not viewed as part of the ‘hard problem’. This implies that there is a relation between the system constituted by the physical body negotiating the external world on the one hand, and conscious experience on the other, in which psychological features, such as beliefs and desires leading to action, are situated, conceptually and functionally, somewhere between these two realms. The alternative approach I will discuss takes the view that conscious experience, rather than being conceptualised as one step beyond psychological functions, in relation to the physical self, should be situated at the interface between the physical body and cognitive processes. Work in the field of experimental psychology, by Balleine and Dickinson (1998), provides empirical evidence consistent with this view. Dickinson and Balleine’s hypothesis is that the function of consciousness is to act as an interface, providing a means of interaction between bodily states and affordances in the external world, enabling rational, goal-directed action. My philosophical work on grounding rationality draws the same conclusion, providing support for Dickinson’s interface theory, Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT). Keywords: interface theory; consciousness; goal-directed action
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
-
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
-
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
-
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
-
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
-
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
-
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
