From sensation to consciousness
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Monica Riccio
Abstract
The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external – the body and his surface – into the inside – the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If “nothing but a body can touch and be touched” (Lucretius, De rerum natura, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of “being touched”, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul
Abstract
The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external – the body and his surface – into the inside – the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If “nothing but a body can touch and be touched” (Lucretius, De rerum natura, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of “being touched”, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
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Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
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Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
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Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
-
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
-
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
-
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
