Experience and identity of the self
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Antonio Lamarra
Abstract
The idea of consciousness, as subjective awareness of the self and of its mental contents, appeared in European culture only in the late 17th century as resulting from a relatively rapid process of conceptual development, which had started in the framework of the post-Cartesian culture. It was rooted in the ancient idea of moral conscience insofar it requested as a condition the existence of a subjective interiority within which any mental content could be objectified and reflected. In addition, a new model of mind was necessary as well as a general concept under which mental contents of any sort could be included. Cartesian philosophy, by assuming that thought and mind were co-extensive, met these requirements. When investigating on personal identity, J. Locke for the first time defined consciousness in modern terms and focused on it as closely linked to the idea of the self. His philosophy of mind was largely influenced by the Cartesian paradigm (and in particular by the assumption that thinking is always a conscious mental operation), although he avoided any metaphysical commitment. In this way, Locke safeguarded personal identity from the turbulences of theological disputes and paved the road to psychology as an empirical discipline. Leibniz on the contrary grounded consciousness on an immaterial substance, the monad, but gave it an intentional relationship with the external world that was alien to Descartes’ as well as to Locke’s philosophy of mind. Moreover, he viewed consciousness as a phenomenon of the self, a reality in itself largely unconscious. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; self; personal identity; mind
Abstract
The idea of consciousness, as subjective awareness of the self and of its mental contents, appeared in European culture only in the late 17th century as resulting from a relatively rapid process of conceptual development, which had started in the framework of the post-Cartesian culture. It was rooted in the ancient idea of moral conscience insofar it requested as a condition the existence of a subjective interiority within which any mental content could be objectified and reflected. In addition, a new model of mind was necessary as well as a general concept under which mental contents of any sort could be included. Cartesian philosophy, by assuming that thought and mind were co-extensive, met these requirements. When investigating on personal identity, J. Locke for the first time defined consciousness in modern terms and focused on it as closely linked to the idea of the self. His philosophy of mind was largely influenced by the Cartesian paradigm (and in particular by the assumption that thinking is always a conscious mental operation), although he avoided any metaphysical commitment. In this way, Locke safeguarded personal identity from the turbulences of theological disputes and paved the road to psychology as an empirical discipline. Leibniz on the contrary grounded consciousness on an immaterial substance, the monad, but gave it an intentional relationship with the external world that was alien to Descartes’ as well as to Locke’s philosophy of mind. Moreover, he viewed consciousness as a phenomenon of the self, a reality in itself largely unconscious. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; self; personal identity; mind
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
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Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
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Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
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Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction ix
-
Section 1. Phenomenal consciousness: Brain, action and interaction
- What reason could there be to believe in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? 3
- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? 19
- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action 41
- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? 59
- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? 73
- Es are good 89
-
Section 2. Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness
- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind 107
- “My mind” 125
- Coherence of conduct and the self-image 151
- Ulysses’ will 179
- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context 207
- Seeing with the hands 227
- Recognition of emotion in others 239
- The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription 259
-
Section 3. Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction
- From sensation to consciousness 289
- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy 301
- Experience and identity of the self 311
- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico 327
- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima Italorum sapientia by Vico 337
- Authors 355
- References 361
- Index 399
