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Zeitschrift

Moral Philosophy and Politics

Editor-in-Chief: Lukas Heinrich Meyer
Herausgegeben von: Jennifer Page , Mark Peacock , Michael Schefczyk und Tongdong Bai
Managing Editor: Harald Stelzer

Sprache: Englisch

Erstveröffentlichung: 30. Mai 2014

Erscheinungsweise: 2 Hefte pro Jahr

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Über diese Zeitschrift

Moral Philosophy and Politics (MOPP) is an international, peer-reviewed journal that publishes original philosophical articles addressing matters of public relevance. The notion ‘public relevance’ is construed broadly to encompass various domains and aspects. The journal has a special focus on the philosophical assessment of policies and their normative foundations, analyses of the philosophical underpinnings or implications of political discourse, and discussions of the justice or injustice inherent in social and political structures that govern human conduct.

MOPP is committed to the ideals of clarity, evidence-based reasoning, and intellectual openness. interdisciplinary work and historical approaches are encouraged when they are relevant to contemporary issues. MOPP considers both theoretical and meta-ethical works, as well as those tackling conceptual problems, provided they offer insights into political, moral, economic or social issues that characterize contemporary societies. Contributors are expected to make clear how their work relates to these issues.

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Current Calls for Papers

‘Philosophizing the Indefensible by Shmuel Nili’, ed. by Ben Jones (for more information, click here)

Call for Special Issues and Symposia

Moral Philosophy and Politics welcomes guest editors who are interested in organizing special issues for our journal. If you have a topic in mind that aligns with the scope and focus of MOPP and would like to collaborate with us, please get in touch with our editorial team. Interested guest editors are kindly requested to include a one-page proposal outlining their envisioned special issue. For more information about the process of publishing a special issue with MOPP, please click here.

Open Access
Constitutional Demoicracy: An International Republican Regime of Human Rights

18. August 2025

Davide Pala

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Nowadays, many new agents, structures and dynamics make human rights insecure – think of TNCs or climate change. Yet states as they currently are seem unable to tackle these threats effectively. So what should an appropriate human-rights regime, that is, one that protects them securely and legitimately , look like, today? This article argues that republicanism provides the regime we need: a constitutional demoi -cracy. This new, mixed human-rights regime is a demoicracy for, even if states remain the primary locus where human rights are realised, they bind themselves to a union that governs together the new agents, structures and dynamics that threaten them, without their demoi merging into one global demos. It is constitutional, for this governing together gives rise to a thin but binding supranational apparatus, whose point is, similar to domestic constitutions, to constrain state power over human rights and at the same time to empower states to protect them.
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Political Liberalism, Exclusion and Metapluralism: A Critical Analysis of John Tomasi’s Account of the Moral Powers of Citizenship

23. Mai 2025

Joshua Clarke

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Upon reading Free Market Fairness , it is apparent that John Tomasi’s defence of market democracy relies on a certain conception of political personality qua citizenship in which the idea of self-authorship is afforded a primary role. With the goal of both clarifying and assessing the merits of said conception, this article begins with a delimitation of Rawls’s and John Tomasi’s account of political personhood qua citizenship. It then moves on to provide several interpretations of the central causality clause associated with Tomasi’s first moral power, favouring a so-called ontological interpretation. Building upon this, the article goes on to argue that Tomasi’s account brings to light problems of exclusivity and metapluralism which afflict, and cast doubt upon, the broader project of political liberalism.
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Must Exploiters Objectively Benefit from Exploitation?

20. Februar 2025

Douglas Ehring

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Various philosophers have claimed that a necessary condition for A to wrongfully exploit B is for A to benefit from interacting with B. On a subjective understanding of benefits, A benefits from an interaction only if that interaction contributes to the satisfaction of one of A’s actual and current goals or desires. On the other hand, interests may be read as objective or real interests. Proposals for characterizing real interests range from those that restrict real interests to psychological states to those that involve states that are not psychological. On the objective understanding, A benefits from an interaction with B only if that interaction promotes one of A’s real interests. I dispute the claim that a requirement of wrongful exploitation is an objective benefit to the exploiter.
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Do Dirty-Handed Public Officials Owe Reparations?

1. Januar 2000

Christina Nick

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In the problem of dirty hands, agents must choose between two incompatible moral demands, thereby inevitably violating an important moral value. While dirty-hands cases can arise in all areas of life, it has been argued that they are particularly pressing in the realm of politics. To illustrate the issue at hand, the paper introduces the real-life case study of the cover up of the Claudy Bombing in Northern Ireland. With the help of this example, the aim of the paper is to suggest a shift in the literature to turn our focus to what is owed to the victims of dirty hands. In particular, it defends the claim that public officials owe reparations to those that have been negatively affected by their dirty-handed decisions. To support this, the paper addresses two worries that opponents of reparations in this context might have, discusses a number of responses, and finds that at least some of them are credible ways of answering these worries. The paper concludes by outlining some key considerations when envisioning what reparations for dirty hands could look like.
Open Access
The Moral Magic Problem in Theories of Rights

1. Januar 2000

Giulio Fornaroli

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According to a widely accepted thesis, all rights violations wrong the right-holder. According to another widely accepted thesis, rights protect interests. But many conventional rights protect morally trivial interests. Hence, the two theses taken together lead to the puzzling conclusion that one can wrong another by frustrating a trivial interest. In this essay, I first introduce this “moral magic” problem and show why the interest theory of rights has no resources to address it.
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Rousseau’s “General Will” and AI: A Framework for Democratic Governance in the Era of Big Tech

1. Januar 2000

Adrien Tallent

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This paper critically analyzes the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the general will (GW), proposing a practical, three-dimensional approach to address the challenges posed by these technologies to democratic governance. The current dominance of automated systems controlled by a few digital giants (“Big Tech”) threatens to undermine collective and democratic decision-making. Building on Rousseau’s notion of the general will as a collective and sovereign expression of the common good, I identify four ways AI erodes the GW: (1) the privatization of the public debate; (2) the individualization of practices; (3) the erosion of personal and collective will; (4) the risk of technological despotism. I then discuss possible pathways to address these challenges and recover the sense of the GW. First, education and mediatization of AI issues would enable the (re)formation of the GW. Then, public participation platforms could allow its expression. Finally, coming back to Rousseau, I call for a renewal of the terms of the social contract through public participation in AI choices. By linking Rousseau’s democratic ideals with modern challenges, the paper presents actionable pathways to align AI technologies with democratic principles and collective representation.
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Art in Service of the State: New Sketch of a State Arts Program

1. Januar 2000

Lukas James Myers

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In the 80s and 90s political liberals debated whether it is legitimate for a state to fund the arts on the grounds that art is a public good. The public goods model is only one way in which the state might justify funding for the arts. Indeed, throughout history, liberal societies have employed artists on behalf of the state and for the benefit of the state. In this paper, I argue that it is, in principle, permissible for the state to fund the arts for the good such funding can provide the state. I sketch a state arts program which has the purpose of producing pro-state art, art which helps to legitimize the state. The state is permitted to do this in order to execute its duty of stability. I defend the permissibility of such a program against the claim that it would be objectionably propagandistic or that it would be too easy to abuse such a program for nefarious means.
Open Access
When and Why Is Social Kind Membership Morally Wrong? On the Moral Foundations of Ontic Injustice

1. Januar 2000

Hauke Behrendt

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This paper argues that Katharine Jenkins’s theory of ontic injustice lacks a fully satisfactory conceptual and moral foundation. Specifically, it fails to provide a compelling account of when and why social kind membership constitutes a moral wrong. I first critique the tension in Jenkins’s framework between an implicit commitment to moral essentialism and an overly positivist ontology of social kinds. I then advocate for moderate practice idealism, which employs counterfactual constitutive standards to better distinguish between just and unjust social kinds. Next, I analyze Jenkins’s account of the wrong-making features of ontic injustice, reconstructing it into three distinct approaches: the expressive harm account, the respect-based account, and the improvement-claim account. While each offers valuable insights, I argue that none provides a sufficiently robust moral foundation of ontic injustice.
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Styles of Social Kinds

1. Januar 2000

Tris Hedges

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In this paper I initiate an important dialogue between the phenomenology of social perception and analytic social ontological discussions of how our perception of others (and concurrent conferrals of social kinds) can be sites of ‘ontic injustice’. Katharine Jenkins develops the concept of ontic injustice to theorise how your being of a social kind can consist, at least in part, of wrongful constraints and enablements. Taking Jenkins’s discussion of interpersonal kinds as the focus, I argue that the phenomenological concept of style enables a more experientially accurate account of how such (oftentimes unjust) interpersonal kinds come into being. My central claim is that Jenkins’s indicator/base property distinction performs a theoretical abstraction from actual embodied lived experience and that these properties are experientially subordinate to how other subjects are first and foremost given stylistically in experience, that is, as unified meaningful wholes. To support this claim, I engage with Jenkins’s example of gender presentation and show how its misalignment with base properties is better made sense of through the tripartite distinction of style, indicator properties, and base property. Introducing this phenomenological perspective enriches the experientially descriptive aspects of Jenkins’s social ontology.
Open Access
Ecological Sustainability: What We the People Owe Ourselves as a Duty of Self-Determination

1. Januar 2000

Jonathan Kwan

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I argue that a people as an intergenerational group has a self-directed duty of ecological sustainability that is a precondition, and even a correlate, of its own right to self-determination. Conceptualizing ecological sustainability as a self-directed duty of self-determination offers several advantages. First, it avoids the nonidentity problem, since the identity conditions of intergenerational peoples do not depend on which specific individuals will become members. Second, it better captures the normatively valuable relationships knitting different generations into a single political community than theories that ascribe rights to self-determination or sovereignty to discrete generations. Third, grounding a duty of ecological sustainability in self-determination not only responds to a distinct demand of legitimacy but also sidesteps problems that arise when appealing instead to justice, especially egalitarian distributive principles. Lastly, I reply to the worry that a duty grounded in the right to self-determination cannot be a genuinely binding duty insofar as a people can simply waive its right to self-determination. I contend that a people cannot permanently waive its right to self-determination while continuing to exist, and even when a people chooses to dissolve, it is still bound by its self-directed duty of ecological sustainability until it ceases to exist.

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Special Issue: Relational Equality and Migration

Special Issue: Mathias Risse and Gabriel Wollner’s On Trade Justice; Guest Editors: Peter Dietsch and Frank J. Garcia

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Special Issue: Towards Foolproof Democracy: Improving Public Debate and Political Decision-Making (Part II); Guest Editors: David Lanius and Ioannis Votsis

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Special Issue: Children’s and Adolescents’ Rights; Guest Editors: Anca Gheaus und Sabine Hohl

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Special Issue: The Ethics of State Mass Surveillance, Guest Editor: Peter Königs

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Special Issue: Towards Foolproof Democracy: Improving Public Debate and Political Decision-Making, Guest Editors: David Lanius and Ioannis Votsis

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Special Issue: Demandingness in Practice Guest Editors: Marcel van Ackeren and Simon Derpmann

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Special Issue: Normative Aspects of International Trade Institutions, Guest Editor: Valentin Beck

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Special Issue: Philip Pettit’s The Robust Demands of the Good, Guest Editors: N. P. Adams and Susanne Burri

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Special Issue: Legitimate Expectations

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Symposium: Autonomy and The Morality of Freedom

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Special Issue: The Ethics of Immigration in a Non-Ideal World, Guest Editors: Jan Brezger, Andreas Cassee and Anna Goppel

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Symposium: Brain Drain and Emigration, Guest Editor: Eszter Kollar

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Symposium on Discrimination, Guest Editor: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen; Symposium on Limits of Markets

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Symposium: Intergenerational Justice and Natural Resources, Guest Editors: Lukas H. Meyer, Pranay Sanklecha, Alexa Zellentin

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Special Issue: Fair Trade

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Special Issue: Global Tax Justice

Die Zeitschrift Moral Philosophy and Politics veröffentlicht Sonder- und Themenhefte, die sich auf wichtige und neu aufkommende Themen im Bereich der Forschung konzentrieren. Die Zeitschrift hat ein strenges Verfahren eingeführt, um sicherzustellen, dass alle Manuskripte für Sonderausgaben denselben Qualitätsstandards und Peer-Review-Verfahren unterliegen wie reguläre Manuskripte. Weitere Informationen über die Peer-Review-Politik der Zeitschrift finden Sie in den "Hinweisen für Autoren".

Call for Papers

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Aktuelle Themenhefte

Band 12 | Heft 2 Special Issue: Relational Equality and Migration

Journal Impact Factor	0.6	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
5-year Journal Impact Factor	0.9	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
Journal Citation Indicator	0.74	2024, Journal Citation Reports (Clarivate, 2025)
CiteScore	2.4	2024, Scopus (Elsevier B.V., 2025)
SCImago Journal Rank	0.403	2024, SJR (Scimago Lab, 2025; Data Source: Scopus)
Source Normalized Impact per Paper	0.777	2024, CWTS Journal Indicators (CWTS B.V., 2025; Data Source: Scopus)

Weitere Informationen über Zeitschriftenmetriken

Moral Philosophy and Politics (MOPP) invites submissions on any topic falling within the scope of the journal. It welcomes both submissions for special issues as well as submissions unrelated to any current call for papers. Submissions should be between 3.000 and 12.000 words in length.

MOPP uses a double-blind refereeing process. The identity of the author(s) of a submission is not known to the referees, nor vice versa. The editor in charge of the submission knows the identity of both. Submissions must be anonymized to allow for blind reviewing. Each submission is typically reviewed by two referees within six to twelve weeks.　

Submissions need not conform to any particular formatting style upon submission, but must be adjusted to the MOPP house style upon acceptance.

Manuscripts are submitted via ScholarOne at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/mopp.

De Gruyter allows authors the use of the final published version of an article (publisher pdf) for self-archiving (author's personal website) and/or archiving in an institutional repository (on a non-profit server) after an embargo period of 12 months after publication. The published source must be acknowledged and a link to the journal home page or articles' DOI must be set. Authors may not self-archive their articles in public and/or commercial subject based repositories. Click here for more information on De Gruyter’s self-archiving policy.

MOPP has a policy of making selected papers of every issue openly available for free.

For information on De Gruyter’s Open Access policy, please click here.

Editor-in-Chief

Lukas Meyer (Graz University, Austria)

Editors

Jennifer Page (Zürich University, Switzerland)
Mark Peacock (York University, Canada)
Michael Schefczyk (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany)
Tongdong Bai (Fudang University, China)

Managing Editor

Harald Stelzer (Graz University, Austria)

Editorial Board

Elizabeth Anderson (University of Michigan, MI, USA)
Arthur Applbaum (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA)
Dieter Birnbacher (Düsseldorf University, Germany)
Rüdiger Bittner (Bielefeld University, Germany)
Idil Boran (York University, Canada)
John Broome (Oxford University, UK)
Simon Caney (Oxford University, UK)
Paula Casal (ICREA/Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain)
Stephen Darwall (Yale University, New Haven, CN, USA)
Andreas Føllesdal (Oslo University, Norway)
Rainer Forst (Frankfurt University, Germany)
Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA)
Stefan Gosepath (Free University Berlin, Germany)
David Heyd (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
Wilfried Hinsch (Cologne University, Germany)
Duncan Ivison (Sydney University, Australia)
Rahel Jaeggi (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Matt Matravers (University of York, UK)
Kirsten Meyer (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
David Miller (Oxford University, UK)
Nenad Miscevic (Maribor University, Slovenia)
Susan Neiman (Einstein Forum, Potsdam, Germany)
Elif Özmen (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Germany)
Nigel Pleasants (University of Exeter, UK)
Thomas Pogge (Yale University, CT, USA)
Mathias Risse (Harvard University, MA, USA)
Sam Scheffler (New York University, USA)
Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Ralf Stoecker (Potsdam University, Germany)
Adam Swift (University of Warwick, UK)
John Tasioulas (University College London, UK)
Leif Wenar (King’s College London, UK)
Andrew Williams (ICREA/Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain)
Lea Ypi (London School of Economics, UK)

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eISSN:

2194-5624

ISSN:

2194-5616

Sprache:

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De Gruyter

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Erstveröffentlichung:

30. Mai 2014

Erscheinungsweise:

2 Hefte pro Jahr

eISSN: 2194-5624

ISSN: 2194-5616

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