Band 71, Heft 3

According to Kant, men cannot do evil for the sake of evil. A satanic act of resistance against the moral law is impossible, and therefore the idea of ultimate evil is called a “mere idea”. However, it isn’t impossible to realize the idea of satanic evil, as is widely thought: the idea of ultimate evil can be fully realized by the everyday evil of men, as if they were ultimately evil. Kant exposes this structure within his Doctrine of Right (1797) as an extension of his philosophy of radical evil, presented in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). This interpretation will be developed in a close reading of the crucial passage – where it is the revolutionizing people of France who are held responsible for having realized the idea of satanic evil.

The critical reception of racist, sexist and anti-Jewish dimensions in the works of canonical authors has moved to the center of philosophical discourse. Many of those who engage in the history of philosophy have defended the established canon and advocated for critical readings. I want to show that the current discourse on Hegel’s treatment of religion misreads his position as “modern”, because it does not take the works of his Jewish contemporaries into account. In my own reading of the Grundlinien , I will show that Hegel’s concept of the division of Church and state does not remain neutral when it comes to religious affiliation but has a clear anti-Jewish bias (I). This serves to show that one can neither adequately identify nor address identity-based discrimination in the works of majoritarian thinkers without an equal commitment to diversifying the canon to include positions of marginalised authorship (II).

A major problem within the philosophy of romantic love is that the following three claims apparently cannot be true together, even though each looks plausible: Der vorliegende Aufsatz handelt von romantischer Liebe, nicht von der Liebe zu Verwandten, zu Tieren, zu Pflanzen, zu nicht-belebten konkreten oder zu abstrakten Gegenständen. . We love people because of their lovable features. Die mit folgendem Trilemma verbundene Schwierigkeit wird prominent diskutiert in Nussbaum (1990), spielt jedoch in vielen weiteren Texten zur Philosophie der Liebe eine wichtige Rolle, beispielsweise in Kolodny (2003) und Bagley (2015). Besonders stark von dem Problem betroffen ist der bekannte Ansatz von Velleman (1999), der Liebe als moralisches Gefühl sieht und sehr in die Nähe von universalem Respekt rückt. . Lovable features can (in principle) have multiple instantiations. 3. When we love someone, the person is irreplaceable for us. If we love someone because of her lovable features, and if a second person can (in principle) have the same lovable features, then the person we love can (in principle) be replaced. I propose a solution for this problem in three steps: I start with some methodological reflections. Secondly, I discuss some proposed solutions from the literature and clarify the first two claims of the trilemma in the process. Thirdly, I present my own solution which focuses on the third claim and which is based on a distinction between a feeling of love on the one hand and a commitment of love on the other. As it turns out, all three claims can be true when interpreted with this distinction in mind.

We are on the way to post-democracy – but where are we today? This article discusses the post-democracy thesis against the background of recent social problems such as the Corona pandemic, the rise of right-wing populism and the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. On the one hand, these problems indicate that Western democracies have taken a further step towards post-democracy. On the other hand, democratic potentials, such as a strengthening civil society and supranational democratic institutions, were also revealed in dealing with these problems. The article argues that in order to counteract post-democratic tendencies, both formal and informal democratic elements need to be strengthened and that it is more necessary than ever to build “bridges” between the two.

Comparing Rancière’s and Crouch’s respective concepts of post-democracy and the way they problematise the state of contemporary (Western) societies, this article opts for a third way to state the problem, associated with the idea of democracy as a form of life. Common to all three approaches is the critique of an ‘engineering attitude’ that conceives problems as disturbances that have merely to be fixed. All three also warn against the dominant influence of economics in politics and the increase of right-wing populism. However, they diverge in their basic understanding of what problems are and how they are constituted. This article will show that the way we conceive the notion of a problem itself has important implications for our understanding of the problems of democracy and our engagement with them.

Post-democracy has become an important contribution to the discourse on democratic theory. On the one hand, this article appreciates the impulses opened up by the diagnosis of post-democracy. On the other hand, it criticizes some problematic presuppositions. Especially the thesis of post-democracy seems to imply an ideal of democracy that is oriented toward a certain type of democracy, without critically discussing it. The tradition of philosophical pragmatism is drawn upon to show how an alternative critical diagnosis of democracy might look. The pragmatist tradition, it is argued, avoids the problems of the diagnosis of post-democracy outlined and develops a normatively grounded concept of democracy. The normative aim of democracy consists in focusing on the experience of vulnerability in the face of violence and suffering. Thus, democracy should be conceptualised as a reflexive practice that asks how to deal with these experiences of vulnerability.

The article looks into the critical potential, but also the limits of the current discussion on post-democracy and the crisis of democracy and proposes an examination of the concept of crisis. The thesis is that the current talk of a crisis of democracy suggests an uncritical, namely restitutive understanding of the crisis that could be appropriated for an apology of Western liberal democracy. In contrast, the text argues for a renewed focus on the self-reflexive and critical potential of the term. Based on a pragmatist concept of problem and action, “crisis” is defined as a certain kind of problem-solving problem and further determined on the basis of four criteria. The contribution this definition makes to the current debate is shown by the example of Jacques Rancière’s diagnosis of post-democracy, which can be read as a diagnosis of crisis in the defined self-reflexive and critical sense.