Volume 71, Issue 1

Tugendhat’s remarks on religion and mysticism are explored in section 5 and 6 of this paper. To this end I outline, in section 1, the role that the criticism of religion has played from its beginnings in philosophy’s self-understanding and its focus on reasoning, which philosophers opposed to the non-reasoning justification of religion. In section 2, I consider philosophy’s relation to empirical statements and to the empirical sciences; in section 3, I discuss Tugendhat’s substitution of anthropology for metaphysics; and in section 4, his moral theory.

In this paper, I explore how bio-hybrid forms can be created and combined starting from organic forms. The thesis put forward is epistemological: the combinatorial practice of bionics, biomimetics, biorobotics, and all design strategies inspired by nature is not based on a kind of biomimetic inspiration, i. e., on a kind of imitation of nature, but on a practice of translation. To develop this thesis, I focus on the practices of contemporary biorobotics, first examining the practice of translating natural forms into technical artefacts as developed by Raoul Heinrich Francé at the beginning of the 20th century, secondly, analysing the production of robots capable of replicating complex locomotion systems and, finally, investigating the interaction between robots and living organisms (fish). In the last part of the paper, I reflect on the philosophical payoff and broader conditions of possibility for this translational practice. I discuss when and to what extent a translation of biological forms into biotechnical ones is acceptable and point out the notion of form that underlies this practice. Moreover, I draw attention to the need to philosophically investigate what happens between different domains of knowledge – and especially between science and technology. This article is thus an invitation to philosophers to develop a philosophy in the interstices of knowledge production.

This article presents Heidegger’s little-known theory of the organism developed in his 1929/30 lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and interprets it as an antithesis to Kant’s theory of the organism contained in his Critique of Judgement (1790 and 1792/3). Heidegger drops Kant’s transcendental caveats in favour of a robust ontological understanding of organismic teleology. Moreover, Heidegger’s alternative approach draws attention to the fact that Kant’s notion of a ‘natural end’ ( Naturzweck ), by being tied to the idea of intelligent design, still places the organism too close to the machine, notwithstanding assumptions of a ‘formative force’ ( bildende Kraft ) and ‘productive organs’ ( hervorbringende Organe ). Heidegger, in contrast, analyses organismic purposiveness in terms of an instinctual capacity ( triebhafte Fähigkeit ) in which an organism’s organs are ontologically grounded as its products, and which explains the specificity of an organism’s wholeness, motility and relation to the world.

The aim of this paper is to provide a basic understanding of the phenomenon of embarrassment by connecting two general questions. Starting with two illustrative examples, it first examines how the phenomenon could be described and what different aspects can be identified. Apart from having an obvious affective or emotional aspect and being embodied in various forms of expression, embarrassment can be considered as having a social aspect because of its close connection to the social setting of a situation. Furthermore, it seems to have an atmospheric quality in that it is experienced not only by the embarrassed person but also by all those present. Secondly the role that embarrassment plays in the context of a person’s life is addressed. Though it is experienced as unpleasant, it can be understood as a form of adequately responding to certain social situations structured by ambiguity.

The paper examines the significance of embarrassment for a concept of political publicity. It is critical of how the common interpretation of this apparently social phenomenon as a “milder form of shame” leads to a functionalist interpretation. According to this interpretation, embarrassment regulates given normative structures by initiating or even motivating self-criticism. In contrast, the article shows, first, that embarrassment cannot occur at all in a public sphere that is thought of exclusively in normative terms, and second, that the phenomenon is primordially not reflexive. In embarrassment, one is not immediately “thrown back on oneself” but tries to find a relation to one’s public figure. A philosophical reflection on this pursuit reveals the constitution of normative structures. In this light, embarrassment presents itself as a genuinely political phenomenon.

This article aims at conceptualising the notion of embarrassment as a negativistic figure of thought that takes the experience of one’s own non-sovereignty as a starting point and emphasises an engagement with situations of not-knowing. This consideration is clarified in discussion with the figure of Socrates or with the philosophical attitude of Socrates. Because the negativistic thrust of the conceptualisation undertaken is reminiscent of irony, the paper then addresses the question of what distinguishes embarrassment understood as a figure of thought from irony. For this purpose, Kierkegaard’s reading of Socratic irony is drawn upon. It is shown that irony is inherently a negativism, which in the last consequence aims at a retention of rights; but this is exactly what embarrassment avoids, because, as the article shows, it is not a negativism of strength, but of weakness.

In recent years, calls for philosophy to interact more with the public have grown louder in the German-speaking world as well as elsewhere. Public philosophy, as it were, has a long-standing tradition, reaching back to Enlightenment-era German “Popularphilosophie” and of course to Socrates and the Sophists. This section presents four short articles on some current aspects of the public-philosophy debate: on the overall conditions for transferring content from academic philosophy to the public in Germany; on the relations between philosophers’ mediatic presence and their disciplinary expertise; on 18th-century guidelines for accessible philosophical writing; and on public philosophy as a social practice that is more than mere unidirectional knowledge transfer.