Volume 71, Issue 4

Life and “good” are interchangeable, I think. Life is good, goodness life. Michael Thompson has recovered the understanding of life as goodness for contemporary philosophy. However, he errs in thinking that our life, human life, is a certain kind of life. And so he errs in conceiving the idea of the good by which we live as that of a certain kind of life. The idea of the good by which we live is not an idea, but the idea. This shows that our life is not a life, but the life. This essay develops a series of forms through which “good” is thought: external purpose, organism, external process, generic process. It transpires that they are all incapable of thinking the good which is thought and known in practical thought. This is life beyond the generic process, no natural life, but the life of the spirit.

This essay defines Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophical language criticism as materialistic. It takes up Max Beck’s discussion of Adorno’s critique of German metaphysical jargon in his paper “Jargon, Bullshit, sinnlos”. However, this essay argues for a twofold critique as being constitutive for Adorno’s approach: It is directed not only at Martin Heidegger’s ontological understanding of language but also at Logical Empiricism’s formalistic understanding of it. Beck’s claim of an affinity between the methods of Adorno and the Vienna Circle is therefore questionable. The first part illuminates the philosophical significance of Adorno’s encounters with the Vienna protagonists. The second part discusses the differences between a formalistic and a materialistic approach: instead of excluding metaphysical expressions as meaningless, Adorno contextualizes them historically and socially. Thus Adorno criticizes early analytic philosophy’s reductive treatment of language and its rigorist understanding of enlightenment. The third part connects the critiques of formalism and of jargon by pointing to their own socio-historical embeddedness. Finally, it argues for the contemporary relevance of such twofold critique.

In Germany, like in many other liberal countries, there is an extensive public discourse about freedom of speech being at risk. It will be insisted in this contribution that on the one hand, freedom of speech as a subjective right of basic law is not endangered. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that in public discourse moralistic exaggerations are quite common. Against this background, the paper asks when different opinions are to be respected and at what point it is permitted or even required to condemn them as immoral. The basic argument advanced here is that opinions should be respected as long as they are based in or at least supported by reasonable moral theories. Those opinions that do not have such a support can be labelled as properly immoral and criticized as such.

Transformative theories of what distinguishes human beings from animals face the problem of conceptually managing the transition from animal to human. This paper will show that this transition contains logical problems that are more rhetorically glossed over than logically solved by the concept of second nature. In the first part, I develop two main concepts of transformative theories, namely that of Hinzutreten (additive capacities occurring in humans) and that of Verwandeltsein (humans already being of a different kind), before outlining in the second part Helmuth Plessner’s anthropological approach as one that elaborates not a transformation, but a holistic difference in the structure of human life as well as a non-metaphysical process of nature’s self-differentiation in human beings as opposed to animals.

According to so-called transformative theories of rationality, human nature is of a fundamentally different kind than the nature of non-human animals, because it is transformed by the possession of rational capacities. This is assumed tobe reflected in the fact that human nature and non-human nature require two fundamentally different forms of explanation: reason-based explanations on the one hand, explanations with reference to natural laws on the other. There is no continuity between these two forms of explanation, i.e. a transition from one to the other is not intelligible. In this paper, I will draw on Hegel to sketch a counter-position to this kind of “continuity skepticism” (Dorit Bar-On, 2013). The central thesis is that Hegel’s project in his anthropology is to make the transition from one order of explanation to another intelligible by outlining an intermediate realm in which the phenomena under investigation are no longer entirely outside, and not yet entirely inside, the rational order of explanation.

Transformative theories of human nature posit that the genus of animality is wholly transformed by the specific difference of reason. The aim of this paper is to show that the two most prominent transformative approaches, ‘resolute’ and dialectical’, face a dialectical impasse that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is able to resolve. First, I outline objections to the resolute approach which motivate the ‘dialectical’ turn to second nature. Second, I show that the dialectical approach faces a dilemma. It either runs into an internal ‘interaction problem’ by its qualitative distinction of nature and spirit. Or it assimilates both in a way that either amounts to a collapse into the resolute approach or which creates the problem of a merely ‘artificial naturalness’. Third, I reconstruct Plessner’s ‘form-typological’ approach to how the genus living being is differentiated into structural types. This enables a dilemma-free rendition of transformation as ‘natural artificiality’: it is human first nature to seek embodied expression in second nature.

Drawing on Hegel’s anthropology, this paper reconstructs ‘madness’ as an essential stage in the formation of the subject by developing the dialectical character of madness. This goes along with resituating the negativity of spirit as arising on an intermediary stage between nature and developed spirit as second nature. Hegel determines the freedom of spirit as “absolute negativity”. Madness shows a moment of radical negativity that is not viable as such. The formation of subjectivity is thus threatened by that which makes it possible. The art of spirit is to over-come this form of abstract negativity, though not to lose the radicality of negativity, but to deepen it. ‘Absolute negativity’ is Hegel’s term for this successful sublation and simultaneous deepening of negativity.

In this paper, I shall draw attention to an as yet unpublished excerpt of a part of Kant’s Religionsschrift (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) written by an unknown author that has been found in Schiller’s literary remains, labelled by the Goethe-Schiller-Archiv as ‘general working material’. A note on the excerpt itself marks it as pertaining to the first edition of Kant’s text. A few questions arise from that find: First, which parts of Kant’s text does the excerpt represent? Secondly, does it really refer to the first edition of the Religionsschrift ? Thirdly and fourthly, who authored it and how did it get into Schiller’s hands? I shall answer the first two questions by providing a tentative transcription based on which I am going to argue that the excerpt treats the first pages of the first part of Kant’s Religionsschrift and does not refer to the first, but indeed the second edition from 1794. As far as the last two questions are concerned, no definitive answer can be given. Instead I detail Schiller’s endeavours and personal contacts around the time of the publication of the Religionsschrift’s second edition, which might provide some clues as to the possible author for future investigations. Furthermore I outline the impact Kant’s discourse had on Schiller’s own philosophical works, i.e. his essay On Grace and Dignity .