Band 55, Heft 3

Diotima’s speech claims that philosophy ranks among the erōtica . The standard reading of this holds that erōs manifests in philosophical activity. This is puzzling. Eros has a reputation for overpowering the psyche, making reasoning impossible. The major interpretive discussion of this puzzle suggests that Diotima (and Plato by proxy) must therefore accept either non-rationalist philosophizing or rationalist erōs . This paper argues for an alternative. The “ancillary activities view” posits that the erōtica do not manifest erōs but are activities undertaken to achieve its telos . On this view, love’s relationship to philosophy is as un-mysterious as wanting something and doing what it takes to get it.

Plato used mathematics extensively in his account of the cosmos in the Timaeus, but as he did not use equations, but did use geometry, harmony and according to some, numerology, it has not been clear how or to what effect he used mathematics. This paper argues that the relationship between mathematics and cosmology is not atemporally evident and that Plato’s use of mathematics was an open and rational possibility in his context, though that sort of use of mathematics has subsequently been superseded as science has progressed. I argue that there is a philosophically and historically meaningful space between ‘primitive’ or unreflective uses of mathematics and the modern conception of how mathematics relates to cosmology. Plato’s use of mathematics in the Timaeus enabled the cosmos to be as good as it could be, allowed the demiurge a rational choice (of which planetary orbits and which atomic shapes to instantiate) and allowed Timaeus to give an account of the cosmos (where if the demiurge did not have such a rational choice he would not have been able to do so). I also argue that within this space it is both meaningful and important to differentiate between Pythagorean and Platonic uses of number and that we need to reject the idea of ‘Pythagorean/Platonic number mysticism’. Plato’s use of number in the Timaeus was not mystical even though it does not match modern usage.

In book IX of the Republic, Socrates offers a strange mathematical calculation, which claims to prove that the tyrant lives exactly 729 times less pleasantly than the king. For the first time, a complete and detailed reconstruction of this difficult text and its underlying structure is offered in the present article. It thereby proves that the distinction between ‘pleasure’ and the ‘image of pleasure’ is one among the keys to understanding the passage. It is furthermore shown how the whole calculation is based on Plato’s ontology of dimensions and therefore proves that this theorem can be taken into account at least already for the time of the Republic.

Recent studies of Aristotle’s meteorology have often focused on questions of scientific methodology rather than on the empirical accuracy of the explanations. Here we wish to focus on Aristotle’s theory of storms, considering them in their historical context and in light of Aristotle’s theoretical commitments, but testing them in terms of their ability to explain the phenomena in question. Aristotle’s approach to storm events follows a general pattern of “outburst” theories proposed by Presocratic thinkers, in which wind, fire, and the like burst out of clouds. Aristotle proposes a two-exhalation theory in which a dry and a moist gas arise by evaporation and can conflict with each other. In Meteorologica II.9 and III.1, he provides his own theory of storms. Modern accounts are hampered by a mistranslation of ‘eknephias’ as “hurricane.” We argue that an eknephias is never a hurricane, but in the first place a theoretical construct meant to account for three distinct phenomena: tuphōn, keraunos, and prēstēr, all of which need to be identified more clearly with actual meteorological phenomena than they have been. We identify appropriate phenomena and also propose a phenomenon corresponding to eknephias, which makes sense of Aristotle’s account.

This paper is a commentary on Epicurus’ Kuria Doxa (KD) 33, according to which “justice is not anything in itself [τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτό].” It explores what it means for something to exist ‘in itself’ in Hellenistic philosophy, speculating on the sources of Epicurean technical vocabulary and suggesting an ontological reading of KD 33.

This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.