Band 55, Heft 1

At Varro LL VI.56 and SE M 8.275-276, we find reports of the Stoic view that children and articulate non-rational animals such as parrots cannot genuinely speak. Absent from these testimonia is the peculiar case of the superficiality of the actor’s speech, which appears in one edition of the unstable text of PHerc 307.9 containing fragments of Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations. Commentators who include this edition of the text in their discussions of the Stoic theory of speech do not offer a univocal account of the superficiality of the parrot’s, the child’s, and the actor’s speech. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of the Stoic account of genuine and superficial speech and show that not only is there an account of superficial speech that univocally explains the superficiality of the speech of parrots, children, and actors, but that this account challenges traditional assumptions about the entities at the heart of the Stoic theory of language— lekta . It will turn out that genuine speech is the expression of a lekton by way of performing a speech act, and that this account of superficial speech can be used to explain other linguistic phenomena that are of interest to the Stoics, such as sentences in insoluble sophisms and sentences containing demonstratives that do not refer to anything in the subject term. Importantly, my reconstruction shows, against the near consensus view of lekta , that lekta do not primarily explain what makes an utterance meaningful. Rather, they primarily explain what makes an utterance an instance of genuine speech.

Three times in Book 1 chapter 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says desire partakes of reason in a way. There is a consensus view in the literature about what that claim means: desire has no intrinsic rationality, but can partake of reason by being blindly obedient to the commands of reason. I argue this consensus view is mistaken: for Aristotle, adult human desire has its own intrinsic rationality, and while it is to be obedient to reason, it is not blind obedience, for when reason tells desire to obey, it includes an explanation supporting its order which desire can at least potentially understand. Thus, the nature of human desire, and also of the characteristic interaction of desire and reason, is much different than it is standardly taken to be.

This paper offers a novel interpretation of the nature and role of logical ( logikôs ) argumentation in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In contrast to the standard domain interpretation, which makes logikôs argumentation the contrary of phusikôs , relying on principles drawn from outside the domain of natural science, I propose that the essential or defining feature of logikôs argumentation is the use of principles that are general relative to the question under investigation. My interpretation is developed and illustrated with a close textual analysis of Aristotle’s explanation of mule sterility in Generation of Animals II 8.

In Meta. Λ 8, Aristotle argues that the heaven (οὐρανός)–and, thus, the cosmos – is numerically unique on the grounds that its first unmoved mover is numerically unique. The latter is numerically unique because it is ‘essence’ (τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι) and does not have matter. “But whatever is many in number has matter.” I refer to this inference as Aristotle’s metaphysical argument for the uniqueness of the cosmos. A problem arises: (A) If the subsidiary unmoved movers of the planetary spheres are, like the prime unmoved mover, immaterial substances and belong to the same species of unmoved mover (qua “thinkers thinking themselves”), it seems that they could not be numerically distinct from that first unmoved mover – while Aristotle maintains that they are, in fact, numerically distinct. That is, as immaterial substance(s), it/they could not be individuated by matter. However, (B) if they do, as souls or soul-like forms, inform matter (namely, that of the celestial spheres which they move), it seems that there is no reason why the first unmoved mover, which moves the sphere of fixed stars or outermost, celestial sphere, should not similarly inform the matter of that celestial sphere. In the latter case, Aristotle’s argument for the uniqueness of the heaven and cosmos would be vitiated. The first unmoved mover would be the form of the outermost celestial sphere; and there would evidently be no metaphysical reason why that form could not be materially instantiated by other outermost celestial spheres, each enclosing its own cosmos distinct from our own. I argue that neither of the two salient options for resolving this problem with Aristotle’s metaphysical argument for the uniqueness of the cosmos is satisfactory. The result, so I maintain, is Aristotle’s diremption of divinity into two essentially unrelated aspects: divinity as autonomous, ‘hermetic’ cognition and divinity as ultimate cause(s) of cosmic motion and change.

I argue that, according to Plato, the body is the sole cause of psychic disorders. This view is expressed at Timaeus 86b in an ambiguous sentence that has been widely misunderstood by translators and commentators. The goal of this article is to offer a new understanding of Plato’s text and view. In the first section, I argue that although the body is the result of the gods’ best efforts, their sub-optimal materials meant that the soul is constantly vulnerable to the body’s influences. In the second section, I argue that every psychic disorder is a disruption of the motions of the inner psychic circles by the body; moreover, I defend my translation of 86b. In the final section, I argue that the goal of education is to restore the circles to their original orbits, and I disarm a possible objection that bad education is also a cause of psychic disorder.

A bstract The Parmenides has been unduly overlooked in discussions of hypothesis in Plato. It contains a unique method for testing first principles, a method I call ‘exploring both sides’. The dialogue recommends exploring the consequences of both a hypothesis and its contradictory and thematizes this structure throughout. I challenge the view of Plato’s so-called ‘method of hypothesis’ as an isolated stage in Plato’s development; instead, the evidence of the Parmenides suggests a family of distinct hypothetical methods, each with its own peculiar aim. Exploring both sides is unique both in its structure and in its aim of testing candidate principles.