From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism
-
Robb Dunphy
Abstract
This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.
Acknowledgment
This paper was written during a research fellowship at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies at the University of Hamburg. I would like to thank Stephan Schmid, Yoah Meyrev, Josê María Sánchez de León Serrano, Philip Choi, other fellows of the Centre, and Gabriel Martin for the opportunity to discuss elements of its argument and for their feedback. This paper was significantly improved by the comments provided by two anonymous reviewers for Apeiron, to whom I am very grateful.
References
Aristotle. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Eichorn, R. 2020. “Sextus Empiricus on Isostheneia and Epochê: A Developmental Model.” Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia 11 (21): 188–209.Search in Google Scholar
Feldman, R. 2002. “Epistemological Duties.” In The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by P. Moser, 362–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0195130057.003.0013Search in Google Scholar
Gibbons, J. 2013. The Norm of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673391.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Grgić, F. 2014. “Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism.” European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4): 653–73.10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00521.xSearch in Google Scholar
Johnsen, B. 2001. “On the Coherence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism.” The Philosophical Review 110 (4): 521–61.10.1215/00318108-110-4-521Search in Google Scholar
Machuca, D. 2011. “Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism.” Philosophy Compass 6 (4): 246–58.10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00391.xSearch in Google Scholar
Machuca, D. 2019a. “Sources of Doxastic Disturbance in Sextus Empiricus.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 56: 193–214.10.1093/oso/9780198851059.003.0005Search in Google Scholar
Machuca, D. 2019b. “Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry.” Apeiron 52 (2): 199–221.10.1515/apeiron-2018-0017Search in Google Scholar
Olfert, C. 2015. “Skeptical Investigation and Its Perks: Diog. Laert. 9.69–70 and 79–89.” In Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius, edited by K. Vogt, 147–70. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.10.1628/978-3-16-156430-7Search in Google Scholar
Palmer, J. 2000. “Skeptical Investigation.” Ancient Philosophy 20 (2): 351–75.10.5840/ancientphil200020234Search in Google Scholar
Perin, C. 2010. The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557905.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Perin, C. 2015. “Skepticism, Suspension, Norms of Belief.” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2): 107–25.10.1163/22105700-04010007Search in Google Scholar
Sienkiewicz, S. 2019. Five Modes of Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus and the Agrippan Modes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780198798361.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Striker, G. 2001. “Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2): 113–29.10.1093/oso/9780198868385.003.0013Search in Google Scholar
Svavarsson, S. 2011. “Two Kinds of Tranquillity: Sextus Empiricus on Ataraxia.” In Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by D. Machuca, 19–31. Dordrecht: Springer.10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_2Search in Google Scholar
Thorsrud, H. 2014. Ancient Scepticism. Oxford: Routledge.10.4324/9781315711737Search in Google Scholar
Vogt, K. 2011. “The Aims of Skeptical Investigation.” In Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by D. Machuca, 32–49. Dordrecht: Springer.10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_3Search in Google Scholar
© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Philosophy’s Workmate: Erōs and the Erōtica in Plato’s Symposium
- Mathematics and Cosmology in Plato’s Timaeus
- Dimensions of Pleasure: A first Detailed Reconstruction of Plato’s ‘Tyrant Number’
- Earth, Wind, and Fire: Aristotle on Violent Storm Events, with Reconsideration of the Terms ἐκνεφίας, τυφῶν, κεραυνός, and πρηστήρ
- Epicurus on Justice ‘In Itself’ (καθ᾽ ἑαυτό) (Kuria Doxa 33)
- From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Philosophy’s Workmate: Erōs and the Erōtica in Plato’s Symposium
- Mathematics and Cosmology in Plato’s Timaeus
- Dimensions of Pleasure: A first Detailed Reconstruction of Plato’s ‘Tyrant Number’
- Earth, Wind, and Fire: Aristotle on Violent Storm Events, with Reconsideration of the Terms ἐκνεφίας, τυφῶν, κεραυνός, and πρηστήρ
- Epicurus on Justice ‘In Itself’ (καθ᾽ ἑαυτό) (Kuria Doxa 33)
- From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism
