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Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation
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Kyung Hwan Baik
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
7. August 2008
We study litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort on her behalf, and the attorneys' effort is not verifiable to a third party. We examine the equilibrium fixed fees and contingent fees for the attorneys in two legal systems: the system with the nonnegative-fixed-fee constraint and the system with the contingent-fee cap. We show that the fixed fees are always zero in the former legal system, and the contingent fees are always equal to the cap in the latter legal system. We examine also the equilibrium expected payoffs for the attorneys and those for the litigants in the two systems. By comparing these expected payoffs, we show that the attorneys prefer the system with the nonnegative-fixed-fee constraint, while the litigants prefer the system with the contingent-fee cap.
Published Online: 2008-8-7
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law
- Measuring Skill in Games with Random Payoffs: Evaluating Legality
- Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction
- Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment
- Damages for Breach of Contract, Impossibility of Performance and Legal Enforceability
- Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma
- Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights"
- Causation and Incentives to Choose Levels of Care and Activity Under the Negligence Rule
- A Positive Theory of Strict Liability
- Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis
- Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages
- Split-Estate Negotiations: The Case of Coal-Bed Methane
- Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation
- The Paradox of Expected Punishment: Legal and Economic Factors Determining Success and Failure in the Fight against Organized Crime
- The Biasing Effects of Memory Distortions on the Process of Legal Decision-Making
- Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906-47
- A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral
- The Hidden Bias of the Vienna Convention on the International Law of Treaties
- Differential Victimization: Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for the Felony Murder Rule
- Underpricing of IPOs and Legal Frameworks Around the World
- Damages or Reinstatement: Incentives and Remedies for Unjust Dismissal
- Jury Verdicts in Drunken Driving Cases
- The Market for Lawyers and Social Capital: Are Informal Rules a Substitute for Formal Ones?
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