Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906-47
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Donald J. Smythe
The Uniform Sales Act was a precursor to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Between 1906 and 1947 it was adopted in 34 states. Transaction cost theory suggests that states’ adoption decisions should have been influenced by “neighborhood effects” – the adoption decisions of their neighbors. This paper uses hazard analysis to test various hypotheses about the factors that influenced states’ adoption decisions. The results indicate that neighborhood effects were among the most important factors in the diffusion of the Act. Manufacturing interests also played an important role, especially in a small number of states that adopted the Act early. Subsequent to these early adoptions, the Act gradually diffused across most of the country, except the south. Its diffusion was driven primarily by neighborhood effects and manufacturing interests, although the legal profession and transportation systems may also have played a role. It appears that the Act ultimately failed to achieve complete uniformity largely because the neighborhood effects that drove its adoption in most of the country were not present in the south.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
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- Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law
- Measuring Skill in Games with Random Payoffs: Evaluating Legality
- Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction
- Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment
- Damages for Breach of Contract, Impossibility of Performance and Legal Enforceability
- Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma
- Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights"
- Causation and Incentives to Choose Levels of Care and Activity Under the Negligence Rule
- A Positive Theory of Strict Liability
- Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis
- Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages
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