Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction

Artikel in diesem Heft

1. Article
2. Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law
3. Measuring Skill in Games with Random Payoffs: Evaluating Legality
4. Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction
5. Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment
6. Damages for Breach of Contract, Impossibility of Performance and Legal Enforceability
7. Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma
8. Frischmann's View of "Toward a Theory of Property Rights"
9. Causation and Incentives to Choose Levels of Care and Activity Under the Negligence Rule
10. A Positive Theory of Strict Liability
11. Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis
12. Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages
13. Split-Estate Negotiations: The Case of Coal-Bed Methane
14. Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation
15. The Paradox of Expected Punishment: Legal and Economic Factors Determining Success and Failure in the Fight against Organized Crime
16. The Biasing Effects of Memory Distortions on the Process of Legal Decision-Making
17. Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906-47
18. A Note on the Social versus Private Value of Suits when Care is Bilateral
19. The Hidden Bias of the Vienna Convention on the International Law of Treaties
20. Differential Victimization: Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for the Felony Murder Rule
21. Underpricing of IPOs and Legal Frameworks Around the World
22. Damages or Reinstatement: Incentives and Remedies for Unjust Dismissal
23. Jury Verdicts in Drunken Driving Cases
24. The Market for Lawyers and Social Capital: Are Informal Rules a Substitute for Formal Ones?
25. Competition and Unitization in Oil Extraction: A Tale of Two Tragedies