Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
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Javid Jafari
Abstract
According to Thomasson’s Easy Ontology, all existential questions have straightforward answers and are solvable by conceptual and empirical work. So there is no need for traditional metaphysics to solve them. First, I give some counterexamples to this thesis from incomplete and undecidable theories. Then I discuss some possible responses, I consider a wider sense of conceptual analysis and argue that even in this sense Easy ontology is not able to resolve the problem and must sacrifice either easiness or answerability. Finally, I will argue that although traditional metaphysics does not make the undecidable sentences answerable, it can still make sense of them and helps us to understand why there are unanswerable questions at all.
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Math can’t Move Matter
- Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions
- Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry
- Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism
- Power, Capacity, Disposition and Categorical Properties: A Roughly Aristotelian Proposal
- Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
- Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett
- Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
- The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Math can’t Move Matter
- Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions
- Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry
- Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism
- Power, Capacity, Disposition and Categorical Properties: A Roughly Aristotelian Proposal
- Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
- Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett
- Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
- The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference
