Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
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Xinyi Zhan
Abstract
Anti-criterialists argue that there are no criteria that ensure personal persistence. However, this perspective is criticized for resulting in an unacceptable consequence that undermines our intuitions, daily beliefs, and direct introspective awareness of personal persistence. I defend anti-criterialism by responding to this objection and arguing that none of these aspects are undermined by anti-criterialism. The flawed objection against anti-criterialism reveals the excessive ambition of criterialism in seeking criteria for personal persistence with metaphysical necessity, which goes beyond our abilities and needs. As beings living in the actual world, we are not able to consider what happens to personal persistence in remote possible worlds. Moreover, to judge whether a person persists or not in daily life, we do not need a criterion that ensures personal persistence in all situations. Anti-criterialism acknowledges the complexity and variability of personal persistence and offers a more realistic and practical approach to understanding personal identity.
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Math can’t Move Matter
- Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions
- Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry
- Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism
- Power, Capacity, Disposition and Categorical Properties: A Roughly Aristotelian Proposal
- Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
- Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett
- Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
- The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Math can’t Move Matter
- Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions
- Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry
- Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism
- Power, Capacity, Disposition and Categorical Properties: A Roughly Aristotelian Proposal
- Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
- Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett
- Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
- The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference
