Intrinsic and Extrinsic Modes
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Michele Paolini Paoletti
Abstract
I offer in this article an account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties based on the ontology of modes. Modes are particular properties that directly depend for their identity on their “bearers”. In Section 1, I shall introduce the ontology of modes. In Section 2, I shall examine the problem of distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic properties by considering another, related problem: that of distinguishing between internal and external relations. In Section 3, I shall present my own account and I shall also single out different degrees of intrinsicality and extrinsicality. In Section 4, I shall deal with missing-relatum modes, namely, with modes that lack specific relata, such as Othello’s loving someone. I shall introduce three different theories to deal with them. Finally, in Section 5, I shall solve some problems affecting the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction from the standpoint of my account.
Funding source: Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca (Italy)
Award Identifier / Grant number: PRIN-2017 Project “The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image” (prot. n. 2017ZNWW7F)
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Research funding: Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca (Italy). Award number: PRIN-2017 Project “The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image” (prot. n. 2017ZNWW7F).
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© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Holism Resurfacing: How Far Should We Go With It?
- An Ontology for ‘The Universe of Being’
- Hume’s Thoroughly Relationist Ontology of Time
- The Implantation Argument: Simulation Theory is Proof that God Exists
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Modes
- Collocation and Constitution
- Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way
- Contra Static Dispositions
- Metaphysical Foundations of Causation: Powers or Laws of Nature?
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Holism Resurfacing: How Far Should We Go With It?
- An Ontology for ‘The Universe of Being’
- Hume’s Thoroughly Relationist Ontology of Time
- The Implantation Argument: Simulation Theory is Proof that God Exists
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Modes
- Collocation and Constitution
- Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way
- Contra Static Dispositions
- Metaphysical Foundations of Causation: Powers or Laws of Nature?
