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Metaphysical Foundations of Causation: Powers or Laws of Nature?

  • Dmytro Sepetyi ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: September 2, 2021

Abstract

In this article, I discuss Richard Swinburne’s case for the conception of substance causation, identified with the substances-powers-liabilities (SPL) account of causation, versus the conception of event causation, identified with alternative accounts. I specify the place of Swinburne’s argument in the debates about agent causation, and uncover reasons to be sceptical about the claims that substance causation is a genuine alternative to event causation, and that it helps to comprehend the specifics of the causation involved in free agency. I also advance considerations in favour of the relations-between-universals (RBU) account of causation that can make it preferable to the SPL account.


Corresponding author: Dmytro Sepetyi, Department of Social Studies, Zaporizhzhia State Medical University, Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, E-mail:

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Received: 2020-10-26
Accepted: 2021-06-09
Published Online: 2021-09-02
Published in Print: 2021-09-27

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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