Collocation and Constitution

David-Hillel Ruben

doi:10.1515/mp-2021-0009

Article

Collocation and Constitution

David-Hillel Ruben

Published/Copyright: September 10, 2021

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From the journal Metaphysica Volume 22 Issue 2

Abstract

Many philosophers accept the view that, when one object constitutes a second (say a tree and an aggregate of wood molecules), the two objects can be entirely in the same place at the same time (collocated). But what of two objects such that neither constitutes the other (a non-constituting pair)? Can they be collocated? If there can be such a pair of objects, they would have to share the same material constituents. To show that there are two collocated objects and not just one object at a specific time and place, one has to show that one of the objects has some property that the other fails to have. I claim that the properties I use in my example are legitimate substitution instances in the Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I offer a metaphysically possible example that illustrates such collocation, a possible case from ‘raw nature’, two trees.

Keywords: collocation; constitution; Kit Fine; Lynne Rudder Baker

Corresponding author: David-Hillel Ruben, Emeritus Professor, Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK, E-mail: d.ruben@bbk.ac.uk

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Kathrin Koslicki, David Mark Kovacs, and Sophie Silverstein for useful input.

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Received: 2021-02-15

Accepted: 2021-03-22

Published Online: 2021-09-10

Published in Print: 2021-09-27

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https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0009

Keywords for this article

collocation; constitution; Kit Fine; Lynne Rudder Baker