Abstract
I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in “split second.” Meanwhile, Bourget’s empirical argument is question-begging. My critique also has implications for debates about the essential temporality and unity of consciousness experience, and, phenomenal atomism.
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© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Hyper-Russellian Skepticism
- Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem
- Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?
- Reconsidering the Case for Colour Relativism
- The New Aristotelian Essentialists
- Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime
- Natural Kinds, Causal Profile and Multiple Constitution
- Representation, Consciousness, and Time
- Time as Motion
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Hyper-Russellian Skepticism
- Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem
- Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?
- Reconsidering the Case for Colour Relativism
- The New Aristotelian Essentialists
- Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime
- Natural Kinds, Causal Profile and Multiple Constitution
- Representation, Consciousness, and Time
- Time as Motion