Abstract
The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes should be realist about the progressive too.
Acknowledgements
Research for this paper was supported by grant 2015/20138-2 from FAPESP (Brazil). I wish to thank Nathan Oaklander for his insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hyper-Russellian Skepticism
- Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem
- Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?
- Reconsidering the Case for Colour Relativism
- The New Aristotelian Essentialists
- Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime
- Natural Kinds, Causal Profile and Multiple Constitution
- Representation, Consciousness, and Time
- Time as Motion
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Hyper-Russellian Skepticism
- Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem
- Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?
- Reconsidering the Case for Colour Relativism
- The New Aristotelian Essentialists
- Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime
- Natural Kinds, Causal Profile and Multiple Constitution
- Representation, Consciousness, and Time
- Time as Motion