Representation, Consciousness, and Time

Sean Allen-Hermanson

doi:10.1515/mp-2018-0007

Article

Representation, Consciousness, and Time

Sean Allen-Hermanson

Published/Copyright: January 23, 2018

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From the journal Metaphysica Volume 19 Issue 1

Abstract

I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in “split second.” Meanwhile, Bourget’s empirical argument is question-begging. My critique also has implications for debates about the essential temporality and unity of consciousness experience, and, phenomenal atomism.

Keywords: Bourget; underived intentionality; consciousness; unity of consciousness; phenomenal atomism; temporal structure; specious present; Moore’s method of isolation

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Published Online: 2018-1-23

Published in Print: 2018-3-26

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https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0007

Keywords for this article

Bourget; underived intentionality; consciousness; unity of consciousness; phenomenal atomism; temporal structure; specious present; Moore’s method of isolation