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Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns

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Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 7. August 2012

Abstract

This paper develops and explores signaling in the market for education based on imperfectly observed heterogeneity in the returns to education rather than heterogeneity in costs. Workers of heterogeneous abilities face the same costs of education, yet the productivity gain from education is higher for more able workers, and employers' observations of productivity are noisy. The paper presents the necessary and sufficient condition replacing the single crossing property in this context, proves that no separating equilibrium exists, and analyzes the mixed strategy equilibrium to produce some new results due to the presence of strategic complementarities.

Published Online: 2012-8-7

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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Heruntergeladen am 18.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/1935-1704.1867/pdf
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