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Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale

  • Yutian Chen EMAIL logo and Debapriya Sen
Published/Copyright: September 14, 2012

Abstract

While the significance of economies of scale in outsourcing has been well-documented, the consequences of outsourcing on firms' R&D efforts, when outsourcing is driven by scale economies, remains unexplored. We investigate a simple model where downstream competitors outsource to a common upstream supplier out of their incentive to better exploit scale economies. We find that the efficiency gain of outsourcing in virtue of economies of scale helps to internalize R&D spillovers, which tends to enhance outsourcing firms' R&D incentives. On the other hand, outsourcing also mitigates downstream competition, which imposes an ambiguous impact on outsourcing firms' R&D incentives. The aggregate effect is that outsourcing enhances R&D investments only when R&D spillovers are sufficiently large, or when upstream economies of scale are sufficiently small.

Published Online: 2012-9-14

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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