Article
Licensed
Unlicensed
Requires Authentication
Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
-
Matteo Cervellati
,
Piergiuseppe Fortunato
and
Uwe Sunde
Published/Copyright:
December 20, 2012
Abstract
This paper studies the interactions between democratization and the emergence of rule of law. We propose a model in which heterogeneous individuals can make costly investments to protect their income against expropriation. The public enforcement of property rights is chosen by the enfranchised population whose composition depends on the political regime in place. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in terms of property rights protection and political regime, and study the role of the different scenarios of democratization. The results suggest: (i) unequal control of natural resources is a central structural determinant of the democratization scenario; (ii) democratic transitions under conflict may lead to failed democracies with poor rule of law; (iii) that democratic transitions supported by a large consensus may serve as a coordination device thereby leading to better protection of property rights and more stable polities.
Keywords: democratization; oligarchy; rule of law; democratization scenario; multiple equilibria; path dependence
Published Online: 2012-12-20
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
You are currently not able to access this content.
You are currently not able to access this content.
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Contributions Article
- Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
- Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
- Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Two Notes on the Blotto Game
- The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
- Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics
- Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games
- Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design
- Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
- Altruism and Local Interaction
- Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns
- An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
- Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
- Topics Article
- Preference for Variety
- Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making
- Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models
- A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
- Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
- Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
- Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
- Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
- An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed
- On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics
- Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale
- On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core
- Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
- Revealing Private Information in Bargaining
Keywords for this article
democratization;
oligarchy;
rule of law;
democratization scenario;
multiple equilibria;
path dependence
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
- Contributions Article
- Uniquely Representing "A Preference for Uniformity"
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies
- Transparency, Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise
- Career Concerns and Performance Reporting in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Two Notes on the Blotto Game
- The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
- Multidimensional Product Differentiation with Discrete Characteristics
- Screening and Financial Contracting in the Face of Outside Competition
- On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
- Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games
- Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design
- Intergenerational Interactions in Human Capital Accumulation
- Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller
- Altruism and Local Interaction
- Education Signaling with Uncertain Returns
- An Axiomatic Approach to Arbitration and its Application in Bargaining Games
- Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
- Topics Article
- Preference for Variety
- Information Theory and Observational Limitations in Decision Making
- Strict Concavity of the Value Function for a Family of Dynamic Accumulation Models
- A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
- Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
- Correlation in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game
- Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions
- Treading a Fine Line: Characterisations and Impossibilities for Liberal Principles in Infinitely-Lived Societies
- An Axiomatization of Learning Rules when Counterfactuals are not Observed
- On a Notion of Similarity with Endowments in Public Economics
- Outsourcing and Downstream R&D under Economies of Scale
- On Communication and the Weak Sequential Core
- Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences
- Revealing Private Information in Bargaining
