Volume 9, Issue 1

The German reform of company taxation in 2008/9 primarily aims at a reduction of corporate income tax rates. To this extent it is in accordance with several proposals, developed by different groups within the academic community. This does however not hold with respect to its systematic embodiments. Tax competition seems to be the reason for several inconsistencies with traditional tax norms.

The latest German tax reform addresses the reduction of the corporate tax burden as well as the issue of tax shifting activities by multinationals. With the aid of ifoMOD, a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, we quantify the outcome of this reform. Our results show that the reform induces a significant decline in corporate sector investments since those firms suffer a cumulative double taxation. As a consequence, GDP decreases by 0.6% in the long-run and overall welfare declines by 0.7% in terms of GDP. The economic activity could, however, be enhanced, if one would abstract from taxing capital gains.

While the existence of outward profit shifting within multinationals at the expense of Germanys national tax revenue is a well-established fact, the exact volume of such activities is at the heart of an ongoing political and academic debate. This article thoroughly analyses the most prominent and most daring of all circulating estimates, a study recently published by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). We reveal its shortcomings and in return present new estimates. Corresponding tax policy implications will also be pointed out.

This article contributes to the debate about Germany as a high or low tax country. The authors have conducted a survey among Swedish companies which have invested in Germany or Austria. The main finding is that the tax burden on a direct investment in Germany is perceived as high, whereas for Austria it is perceived as average. Germany does not owe its bad image to uninformed investors: respondents engaged in Germany feel more negative about the tax burden there than respondents without a German investment. Investors’ estimates seem to be based on statutory rather than effective tax rates.

The ultimate aim of the EU Savings Tax Directive is the effective taxation of interest income. The EU has switched with the Directive from a policy which was based on trust in the citizens and on a certain degree of self-determination, to a procedure which is characterized by distrust and monitoring. On the other hand the Directive’s regulations which focus on the classical behavioural determinants of tax evasion seem to be insufficient. In sum, it is possible that the Directive has failed to achieve its goal. The integral mechanism of the Directive is tax-related information exchange. Since tax-related information exchange is a strategic variable for the member states to adjust the attractiveness of their financial markets, it is debatable whether existing loopholes in the national implementations are the result of hidden non-cooperative behaviour of the member states.

The structure of income taxation in Germany implies that the marginal and the average tax rates will rise significantly in the next years - even if the increase of nominal incomes is modest. The elasticity of the wage income tax revenues with respect to gross wages amounts to about 1.86, assuming that wages on average rise by 2 percent per year; such wage increases would probably mean that real wages hardly rise. The rising tax rates impair the incentives to work and dampen the growth of potential output. Regular tax rate cuts are necessary to avoid bracket creep. Indexation of the income tax system might be the solution.