Volume 49, Issue 2

Wolfhart Pannenberg's eschatological ontology has been criticised for undermining the goodness and reality of finite creaturely differentiation. Drawing on David Bentley Hart's recent ontological proposal, this article explores the critique of Pannenberg's ontology, and offers a defence of Pannenberg's depiction of the relationship between difference and totality, especially as it is presented in his 1988 work, Metaphysics and the Idea of God . In this work, Pannenberg articulates a structured relationship between difference and totality in which individual finite particularities are preserved and affirmed within a coherent semantic whole. Creaturely differences are not sublated or eliminated in the eschatological totality, but they are integrated into a harmonious totality of meaning. This view of the semantic function of totality can be further clarified by drawing an analogy between Pannenberg's ontological vision and Robert W. Jenson's model of the eschatological consummation as a narrative conclusion to the drama of finite reality. Zusammenfassung Wolfhart Pannenbergs eschatologische Ontologie wurde dafür kritisiert, dass sie den Wert und die Realität endlicher kreatürlicher Unterscheidung unterwandere. Dieser Artikel stützt sich auf David Bentley Harts aktuellen ontologischen Entwurf und untersucht die Kritik an Pannenbergs Ontologie. Dabei wird Pannenbergs Darstellung der Beziehung zwischen Unterschied und Totalität , wie sie vor allem in seiner Arbeit von 1988, Metaphysik und Gottesgedanke , vorgestellt wurde, verteidigt. Er beschreibt darin ein strukturiertes Verhältnis zwischen »Unterschied« und »Totalität«, in dem einzelne, endliche Besonderheiten innerhalb eines schlüssig zusammenhängenden semantischen Ganzen bewahrt und bestätigt werden. Kreatürliche Unterschiede werden in der eschatologischen Totalität nicht aufgehoben oder ausgesondert, sondern in ein harmonisches Bedeutungsganzes integriert. Diese Sicht der semantischen Funktion der Totalität kann noch deutlicher werden, wenn man eine Analogie zwischen Pannenbergs ontologische Vision und Robert W. Jensons Modell der eschatologischen Vollendung als narrativem Ziel des Schauspiels der endlichen Realität zieht.

Johann Georg Hamann responds to the philosophical question ‘What is truth?’ with a phenomenology of philosophical concepts. For him, philosophical definitions remain abstract and insufficient because philosophical concepts as speech-acts are not definable but indications of events where man allows that something is said to him. The answer to the question of truth is the arrival of the Word which reveals the individual. Starting from this ontological and sociological assumption Hamann rejects the realm of self-sufficient reason in philosophizing and describes a dynamic process of truth consisting of linguistic geology, experienced aesthetics and traditional formula instead. His geology therefore emphasizes the confinement of man to concrete things as the field of his work, whose fertility proves (Be-währung) his actions. His aesthetics stresses the sensual perception (Wahr-nehmung) of God as the basis of human existence and his use of formula the safekeeping (Be-wahrung) of human life in biblical texts. This threefold event of truth is in its concrete individuality poetry of God as author.

In this paper I respond to Gunter Zimmermann's article on doubt and faith in God that was published in this journal last year, by offering some criticisms of his views and elaborating on certain issues that Zimmermann leaves nearly or entirely untouched. First, I argue that Zimmermann's analysis of doxastic doubt is incomplete. Next, I defend the thesis that whether some specific doxastic doubt is compatible with someone's faith depends in at least four regards on the person who has that doubt. Subsequently, I champion the view that some so-called fiducial doubts are compatible with faith in God, whereas certain others are not. Also, I explain why by its very nature having some fiducial doubt entails having some doxastic doubt. Finally, I deal with some biblical passages in order to show why they do not preclude the possibility of someone's having faith and at the same time having certain fiducial doubts. Zusammenfassung In diesem Aufsatz antworte ich auf Gunter Zimmermanns Artikel, der in dieser Zeitschrift zum Thema Zweifel und Glaube an Gott erschien, indem ich einige Kritikpunkte vortrage und zudem auch auf solche Aspekte des Themas eingehe, die Zimmermann fast oder vollständig unbeachtet ließ. Zunächst stelle ich dar, dass Zimmermanns Analyse des Glaubenszweifels (doxastischer Zweifel) nicht vollständig ist. Dann stelle ich die These auf, dass es in mindestens vier Gesichtspunkten von der zweifelnden Person selbst abhängt, ob ein spezifischer doxastischer Zweifel mit dem Glauben der Person zu vereinbaren ist. Sodann vertrete ich die Ansicht, dass einige Formen des so genannten fiduziellen Zweifels mit dem Glauben an Gott vereinbar sind, andere hingegen nicht. Ein nächster Schritt erklärt, warum fiduzieller Zweifel notwendiger Weise doxastischen Zweifel mit einschließt. Zum Schluss zeige ich an einigen biblischen Texten, dass sie die Möglichkeit zu glauben und gleichzeitig in bestimmter Weise fiduziell zu zweifeln nicht notwendig ausschließen.

This article is the attempt at a dialogue with Bruce McCormack about the position he espoused in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth concerning the relation between God's Election of grace and God's Triunity. I had criticized McCormack's position in my book, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity (2002), but I did not elaborate on it in great detail. To develop the dialogue I will: 1) consider McCormack's claim that in CD II/2 Barth made Jesus Christ “rather than” the Eternal Logos the subject of election; 2) consider what Barth means when he speaks of Jesus Christ “in the beginning”; 3) compare McCormack's thesis that the Father never had regard for the Son, apart from the humanity to be assumed, with Barth's belief that we must not dispute the eternal will of God which “precedes even predestination”; 4) analyze in detail McCormack's rejection of Barth's belief that the logos asarkos in distinction from the logos incarnandus is a necessary concept in trinitarian theology; 5) discuss Barth's concept of the divine will in relation to the concept advanced by McCormack and suggest that McCormack has fallen into the error of Hermann Schell by thinking that God in some sense takes his origin from himself, so that God would only be triune if he elected us; 6) explain why it is a problem to hold, as McCormack does, that God's self-determination to be triune and his election of us should be considered one and the same act; and finally 7) explain McCormack's confusion of time and eternity in his latest article on the subject in the February, 2007 issue of the Scottish Journal of Theology , and his own espousal of a kind of indeterminacy on God's part (which he theoretically rejects). Zusammenfassung Dieser Artikel ist der Versuch eines Gesprächs mit Bruce McCormack über die Position, die er in seinem Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth hinsichtlich der Beziehung zwischen Gottes Gnadenwahl und Gottes Dreieinigkeit darlegte. Ich hatte McCormacks Position in meinem Buch Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity (2002) kritisiert, jedoch die Kritik nicht in großem Detail ausgearbeitet. Um das Gespräch zu entwickeln, werde ich: 1) McCormacks Behauptung, dass Barth in CD II/2 Jesus Christus »eher als« das ewige Wort zum Gegenstand der Wahl machte, betrachten; 2) veranschaulichen, was Barth meint, wenn er von Jesus Christus »am Anfang« spricht; 3) McCormacks These, dass der Vater den Sohn nur so in den Blick bekommt, dass er Menschlichkeit annehmen solle, mit Barths Annahme vergleichen, die besagt, dass wir nicht den ewigen Willen Gottes bestreiten sollen, der »sogar vor der Prädestination da war«; 4) im Detail McCormacks Zurückweisung von Barths Annahme analysieren, dass der logos asarkos im Unterschied zum logos incarnandus ein notwendiges Konzept in der Trinitätstheologie darstellt; 5) Barths Vorstellung vom göttlichen Willen in Beziehung zu dem Konzept von McCormack diskutieren und die Beobachtung unterbreiten, dass McCormack den Irrtum Hermann Schells begeht, da er glaubt, dass Gott in irgendeinem Sinn seinen Ausgang aus sich selbst heraus nimmt, so dass Gott nur dann dreieinig sein könne, wenn er uns erwählt; 6) erklären, warum es ein Problem darstellt, mit McCormack zu behaupten, dass Gottes Selbstbestimmung, dreieinig zu sein, und seine Erwählung als ein und dieselbe Handlung betrachtet werden sollen; und schließlich 7) McCormacks Verwechslung von Zeit und Ewigkeit in seinem neuesten Artikel über das Thema in der Februar 2007Ausgabe des Scottish Journal of Theology darlegen und seine eigene Annahme einer Art von Unbestimmtheit auf Seiten Gottes (die er theoretisch ablehnt).

Discussing the thoughts of J. Moltmann, J. B. Metz and O. Marquard the essay attempts – whilst following Martin Luther's theologia crucis – to find a relation between the theodicy-question and the theology of the cross. For this concern it refers to the aspect that God acts in suffering in a hidden way but does not posses suffering as an intrinsic characteristic. Rather, the lament of suffering people address to God, as we find it in the Psalms, gives the opportunity of bringing suffering from God's hiddenness to an end and to “flee from God to God”. Returning to Luther's theologia crucis should lead to further reflections on theodicy, sin, theology of the cross and eschatology. At the same time, lamentation as bringing human suffering before God provides an aid for suffering people not to lock their suffering in themselves, but to maintain the relationship to God – even against the supposedly factual evidence of the experience of suffering.

Luther took great trouble to comprehend the sense of Jesus' promise to Peter, that he would give him the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 16:19), and through this to unravel the imagery. His horizon focussed increasingly in this question on his clash with the papacy which was indeed existential for him. Luther developed the concept of an Office of the Keys, which described his own reformatory position as an alternative to the papacy: the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins as epitome of the gospel in strict concentration on Word and faith. However, he was not successful in backing up his outline sufficiently in exegetical and practical or ecclesiastical terms. This becomes evident, for example, in that the Lutheran tradition did not adopt Luther's understanding of this text, but instead went other ways, without achieving a clear conception. Exegetical observations on the basic text in Matthew allow a starting point which is not orientated on a confessional confrontation, but attempts to understand the text in the light of the situation in which the Jewish-Christian congregation found itself in the lifetime of the evangelist.