Band 116, Heft 4

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant introduces the ideal of systematicity , represented by the connection of three principles of reason. At the core of the discussion in the Appendix is the distinction between the constitutive use of concepts of understanding and the regulative use of ideas of reason. This article shows that certain passages from the Appendix suggest that Kant’s concept of the “use” ( Gebrauch ) of a rule could explain an interpretative difficulty that arises in paragraph 70 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment . In this passage, the principle of the causality of nature (originally a constitutive–critical principle) seems to be assimilated to the thesis ( Satz ) of an antinomy composed of merely regulative principles. This article aims to demonstrate that this assimilation is impossible.

The present article argues that a single logic underlies Kant’s deduction of nature’s purposiveness in the Critique of Judgment and the deduction of the highest good in the Critique of Practical Reason . Both deductions are, as I would term it, transcendental deductions of success: a “success” deduction establishes the conditions for the realizability of a goal or an activity. Kant’s first developed “success” deduction is the deduction of the highest good: if the promotion of the highest good is practically necessary, then the conditions for its possibility (the existence of God) must be postulated. In the third Critique , however, the same logic is applied to theoretical cognition of empirical nature: if cognition of nature’s forms is to be possible, then nature must be assumed as purposively designed (for human cognition). Thus, I argue that in the third Critique Kant treats theoretical cognition as a practical activity, or, pari passu , Kant employs the “success” deduction model in both practical and theoretical contexts. Finally, I consider Kant’s transcendental deduction of success against the backdrop of his transcendental deduction of the categories

The text of the Doctrine of Right as it was published in 1797 is generally considered to be philologically problematic, and there is debate in the literature regarding the correct arrangement of its different parts. One such topic is the correct order of the introductions and divisions of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Doctrine of Right, respectively. This paper proposes moving paragraph AA 06: 242.12–19, which discusses the “highest division of natural law”, from its current position at the end of the ‘Division of the Metaphysics of Morals’ to the ‘Division of the Doctrine of Right’. Specifically, it proposes inserting the paragraph in question right after AA 06: 237.17 in section B, no. 1 of the ‘Division of the Doctrine of Right’, where the domain of right is divided into natural and positive law.

The Preisfrage proposed by the Berlin Academy in 1788 on the progress of metaphysics in Germany reflected, to some extent, the endeavor of certain academics who sought to reform Leibnizian monadology. This intention was also present in Kant’s Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft, durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll and in the drafts in which he would address the Academy’s question. This article aims to analyze Nicolas de Béguelin’s critical interpretation of the concept of monads, understood as representing the elements of natural reality beyond phenomena. In two of his memoirs published in the Academy’s yearbooks, Béguelin resolved this issue through an analogical use of the connotations of organic teleology, in order to formulate a hypothesis that would prove consonant with the requirements of experience-bound knowledge. Certain limited convergences between Béguelin’s views and Kant’s are then described and assessed.

Johann Christoph Schwab was among the first members of the Berlin Academy to engage with Kant’s philosophy in the late 1780s. His memoir on the relationship between ideas and things contains numerous signs of sympathy toward Kant’s thought, even though he rejected Kant’s version of idealism. In the 1790s, however, Schwab’s stance shifted, culminating in a complete rejection of Kantianism. This is especially evident in his 1795 essay for the Preisfrage on the progress of metaphysics, where he presents Kant’s philosophy not only as a regression in the development of German metaphysics but also as a dangerous drift toward skepticism. This paper explores Schwab’s changing attitude toward Kant, while also demonstrating that his own position cannot simply be reduced to an obsolete form of Wolffianism, as it reflects a more distinctive approach.

The controversy involving Eberhard is almost always studied from Kant’s point of view, with its second round largely neglected following Kant’s publication of “On a Discovery” in 1790. Yet, far from the rhetorical struggle to reappropriate the Leibnizian heritage that dominated the first round, Eberhard’s replies after 1790 seek to challenge Kant’s characterization of dogmatic philosophy, to which those who called themselves dogmatic philosophers did not subscribe. In particular, Eberhard challenges Kant’s claims that Leibniz made no preliminary investigation into the power of a priori knowledge and thus made an unlimited use of reason. Through this confrontation, Eberhard intends to show that Kant is mistaken about the status of geometrical propositions and that his conception of a priori intuition stems from a confusion between the content and the mode of access to the proposition. For Eberhard, there is no such thing as an a priori intuition; moreover, there is a sense in which one can have cognition, though limited, of things-in-themselves. Despite all his efforts to show that Kant was inciting a phantom conflict with a strawman Leibniz, Eberhard recognized that in the end, he had no effect on Leibniz’s reception and had thus started a phantom conflict of his own.

This article examines the reception of Kant’s theoretical philosophy at the Berlin Academy during the 1790s, with particular attention to two central themes: philosophical method and the status of metaphysics. I argue that Kant’s ideas were received at a moment when academic philosophy had already emerged as an autonomous current within the late German Enlightenment. The philosophers of the Academy actively engaged with his writings, using them as a catalyst to refine and radicalize their own views on the practice of philosophy and the role of metaphysics. The analysis focuses on the memoirs of J.-B. Merian (1723–1807) and L. F. Ancillon (1740–1814), who sought to counter what they perceived as Kant’s dismantling of metaphysics. I contend that, despite earlier opposition to Wolff’s system within the Academy, the members of the speculative philosophy class strove to reassert the value of metaphysics, gravitating toward a more Wolffian perspective. Thus, by the end of the 1790s, earlier pluralistic conceptions of metaphysics had largely given way to a foundational approach aimed at countering Kant’s critique.

This paper presents a comprehensive account of the rediscovered Logik-Volckmann, a hitherto unedited transcript of Kant’s logic lectures, written by Johann Wilhelm Volckmann between 1782 and 1783. The manuscript, preserved today in the Kant estate at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, is shown to derive from the same textual tradition as the Hechsel and Wiener notes, belonging to the so-called “Hoffmann-group” (Adickes). Through a detailed philological and codicological examination, the study reconstructs the provenance, transmission, and internal structure of the text, revealing its dependence on at least two earlier sources. The close parallels with V-Lo/Hechsel and V-Lo/Wiener confirm an early date of composition and thus connect the text with Kant’s lectures immediately following the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Volckmann’s transcript preserves numerous formulations that anticipate or echo central distinctions of the Critique , such as that between the world-concept and the school-concept of philosophy. His compilation method illustrates how Kant’s students received, combined, and transmitted his evolving conception of logic. The paper therefore contributes to clarifying the formation of Kant’s logical corpus and the pedagogical mediation of his critical philosophy. It provides a solid textual and historical basis for future editorial and interpretative work on Kant’s lecture materials.