Band 106, Heft 4

Abstract: In this article it is shown that a careful analysis of Kant’s Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise leads to a conclusion that does not match the usually accepted interpretation of Kant’s reasoning in 1747, according to which the young Kant supposedly establishes a relationship between the tridimensionality of space and Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Indeed, it is argued that this text does not yield a satisfactory explanation of space dimensionality, and actually restricts itself to justifying the tridimensionality of extension .

Abstract: Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded (e.g. with reference to KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. (§ 13), which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis.

Abstract: This study points out four important weaknesses in the construction of the Fourth Antinomy of Pure Reason , which reveal its intrinsic instability. The analysis shows that these argumentative weaknesses do not stem from contingent awkwardness. They prove the insubstantial nature of a cosmological theme which, when the question is about modality, cannot support any real dialectic. The rational quest for absolute necessity, which indeed arises in a cosmological context, can only lead to a theological question – which breeds an illusion too, but a much more substantial one.

Abstract: In this paper I argue that Kant’s claim regarding the asymmetry between the need for happiness and the fulfilment of happiness means that no rational human being could hypothetically wish to repeat its own existence. I show that from this claim it follows that it could be rationally desirable for human beings not to be brought into existence. Thus I show that a Kantian response is available for the contemporary applied ethics question whether human beings are harmed by coming into existence.

Abstract: Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk belongs to the group of true Kant-followers of the “closed Kantian” (“geschlossen kantische”) period [Gerhard Stammler] of earlier Kantianism in Halle (approx. 1770–1817). Except for his philosophy of religion, his philosophical work has thus far been ignored. Significant in this regard is our lack of biographical data on Tieftrunk. Some puzzles, however, such as his date of birth, have now been solved.