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Probleme des ‚kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus im Hinblick auf die B-Deduktion

  • Dennis Schulting EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: December 20, 2015
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Abstract:

Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded (e.g. with reference to KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. (§ 13), which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue that the nonconceptualists are wrong to believe that intuitions as such refer objectively and that they are mistaken about the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis.

Published Online: 2015-12-20
Published in Print: 2015-12-20

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