Volume 106, Issue 1

Abstract: In Kantian philosophy (between 1787 and 1798), the concept of revolution is used in the context of theoretical knowledge (geometry, physics, astronomy), metaphysics (his own critique) and morals (right, ethics). A revolution leads to a fundamental change: where the subject once had to follow external determinations, he now subdues objects via his own legislation. Heteronomy becomes autonomy. Kant organizes the revolutions in an order that follows not the empirical facts of history, but the structure of philosophical reason. The two most important texts are the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787) and the second chapter of the Conflict of the Faculties (1798).

Abstract: Schelling’s Presentation of the Natural Process (1843/44), which traces back to a Berlin lecture manuscript, constitutes the only example of an elaborated natural philosophy of Schelling’s latest creative period. Thereby, certain ontological main features of subject-independently existing things and beings, such as the feature of being based on an ontology of spatially existing bodies, and being descended from an evolving overall context of causally connected processes, are speculatively derived from the initial idea of existence that is to be presupposed to all sciences. For, according to that, bodies are to be conceived of as ontologically fundamental, Schelling needs to critically incorporate Kant’s transcendental argumentation for space as a merely subjective form of intuition that does not permit any inference to the nature of things-in-themselves, and to invalidate it at the same time, in order to transform it into a novel theory of space, according to which space and spatiality of the therein occurring objects need to be considered as real conditions of actually existing beings that are a priori and even prior to the subject.

Abstract: In this paper I sketchily deal with some critical points concerning the first chapter of Oliver Sensen’s book, Kant on Human Dignity. These points are as follows: (i) Sensen interprets only a few passages in any great detail; (ii) where we do encounter more precise analysis, Sensen suggests that human beings are to be respected just because one must respect them; (iii) Sensen criticizes a position (according to which Kant has a concept of value that is independent of the moral law) that is obviously wrong and, in any case, not the crucial point; (iv) Sensen misconceives the function of respect as something that grounds knowledge; (v) he is wrong to consider freedom a non-normative concept; (vi) he does not sufficiently clarify the precise meaning of “metaphysical”; (vii) section III of the Groundwork is virtually ignored; and (viii) Sensen overlooks the fact that the relational property ( ist erhoben über ) is based on an intrinsic property ( hat Würde ).

Abstract: In his book, “Kant on Human Dignity”, Oliver Sensen argues that the standard interpretation of Kant’s conception of human dignity as an absolute value property is mistaken. According to Sensen, the standard interpretation is based on the assumption that Kant endorses Moorean moral intutionism. This leads to the false view that we must first perceive that other human beings have value and then infer that we ought to respect them. Against this standard interpretation Sensen claims that Kant endorses moral prescriptivism. According to this view a value statement is “nothing more than a (rational) prescription that commands what we should value”. If we interpret Kant’s moral epistemology along these lines, we will come to see that dignity is in fact a relational concept. In this paper I want to agree with Sensen that Kant was not a moral intuitionist. In thinking that objectivity in morality would require that the moral law “exists” independently of rational cognizers the moral intuitionist presupposes a conception of objectivity rather than arguing for it. The unargued presupposition is that the object has to be something other than the cognizing subject itself. However, the fact that intuitionism is not the adequate account does not imply that the standard interprtation of Kant’s conception of human dignity is mistaken. In other words, the claim ‘intuitionism is false’ and ‘human dignity is an absolute value property’ are compatible. I believe that Sensen ultimately does not sufficiently appreciate the fact that the moral law is the form of practical cognition . Presriptivism only claims that a certain actionis rational, but it does not explain why we perform it. Since the inner worth of a good action as well as the inner worth of humanity as such depends on practical cognition a priori, I don’t see any reason why we should resist the claim that Kant ascribes an absolute or inner metaphysical value property both to humanity and to particular morally good actions. My paper comes in three parts. I first want to show why Kant is neither a moral intuitionist nor a prescriptivist but that his view is best described as a view I call ‘moral idealism‛. I then argue that moral constructivism does not have the voluntarist or subjectivist implications Sensen takes it to have, and that is much closer to the position he sympathizes with. Finally I show on textaul grounds why Kant did in fact ascribe an absolute value to humanity and to morally good actions.

Abstract: I argue that ‘end in itself’, as Kant uses it in the Groundwork , is foremost a normative concept, and not mainly a descriptive one, as Oliver Sensen claims in his book Kant on human dignity . Sensen is right in arguing that dignity is not a value concept that signifies some obscure property. But he does not acknowledge the basis of dignity that lies in a relation to ourselves in which we stand in determining ourselves as willing subjects. Although dignity is not the reason why the moral law is binding on us, it is of vital importance to understand the nature of Kant’s conception of obligation. Dignity denotes the normative priority of freedom and of the law of freedom as against the law of nature.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between Kant and the traditional view of dignity. I argue that some amendments to Sensen’s description of the traditional paradigm enable us to see more clearly both where Kant adheres to the latter and where his view is original. First, a consideration of Pufendorf’s use of dignity suggests (1) that, contrary to Sensen’s reconstruction, the traditional paradigm does not entail a connection between dignity and duties to oneself, and (2) that Pufendorf’s understanding of dignity as a kind of esteem, as opposed to price, provides a crucial mediation between the traditional view and Kant’s view. Finally, I argue that the traditional understanding of dignity also includes a subordinate justificatory element that helps to explain Kant’s use of dignity in the Doctrine of Virtue .

Abstract: The justification for Kant’s dictum to treat oneself and others never merely as a means can be read in very different ways. In this article I respond to comments made by Dieter Schönecker, Jochen Bojanowski, Heiner Klemme and Stefano Bacin on the justification I offer in my book Kant on Human Dignity . In the book I argue against the most popular reading of Kant’s justification, which tries to base the respect one owes to others on a value they possess. In contrast, my view ties Kant’s justification more closely to his theoretical philosophy, and argues that it is based on an a priori law. In my response I clarify several points I made in the book: I spell out how Kant conceives of value as a prescription of reason, why value cannot be the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy as well as whether it needs a special end to motivate moral actions, and what Kant means by ‘end in itself.’ In this article I also enlarge upon the positive account of why one should respect others, and how Kant conceives of this requirement to be based in pure reason. Finally, I offer a modified reading of the traditional paradigm of dignity to which Kant also adheres. Unlike the account I give in the book, I do not believe any longer that in this conception dignity is always connected to a duty to oneself, and I grant that this conception has often been used as an intuitively plausible but incomplete shorthand argument for the requirement to respect others.