Volume 106, Issue 3

Abstract: In his Doctrine of Right (1797), Kant claims that all three components of public law must be realized if perpetual peace is to be achieved: state law, the law of peoples, and cosmopolitan law. In their accounts of Kant’s cosmopolitan law, commentators have noted Kant’s remark that the Earth is not an infinite plane surface, but a globe. A close reading of section 43 shows, however, that the sphericity of the Earth is also a condition of the possibility of Kant’s new state law of peoples ( Völkerstaatsrecht ), a law oriented toward the ideal of a ‘global’ state of nation states ( Völkerstaat ). This means that the closed political space of the Earth, which is a purely contingent condition, had a decisive impact on Kant’s threefold conception of public law.

Abstract: A famous passage in the first Critique (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his critical account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the Groundwork . When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first Critique concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the Groundwork supplies a new conceptual link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second Critique (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom.

Abstract: In the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant refers to two deductions of the categories: the objective and the subjective deduction (KrV, A XVII). This well-known reference possesses several problems of interpretation and has been widely addressed in the specialized literature. Regarding this reference, the accepted interpretation is that both deductions refer to two different tasks of one and the same deduction: the transcendental deduction of the categories. There is nevertheless a widely overlooked passage in the Critique of Pure Reason that suggests a different interpretation on the issue. This passage is to be found in the transcendental Dialectic in the context of the discussion about the possibility of a deduction of the transcendental ideas (KrV, A 336/B 393). According to this passage I will argue in this paper that the objective deduction of the categories corresponds to the transcendental deduction of the categories while the subjective deduction of these concepts corresponds to the metaphysical one.

Abstract: This paper seeks to discover the purpose of Kant’s “Typic of Pure Practical Judgement” in the Critique of Practical Reason . My first thesis is that the problem underlying this chapter is not a new discovery of the Critique : the function of pure practical judgement is simply to test the morality of maxims by means of the so-called type. The new complexity of this approach still calls for a renewed investigation into an old puzzle. To that effect, my second thesis is that the maxim test is related to the doctrine of the categories of freedom, which Kant also newly introduced in the Critique . How the test procedure works in detail will be explained in light of the categories.

Abstract: The later Kant (1797/98) believed that he had solved the highest problem of humankind, namely, how a society should be constituted by law so that the freedom of each one of its members is maximized under the law and an irresistible power is instituted by law to protect the freedoms of its members (I). The core of his solution is his threefold idea of public law: 1. the constitutional law of the state; 2. public international law; and 3. cosmopolitan law (II). In order to solve this problem epistemologically and to implement it through action, Kant offers two transcendental principles of public law (II and III). Today, modern communication technologies might help us to further realize Kant’s idea of public law (IV).

Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant presents the sketch of a theory of practical freedom which is “grounded on” the idea of transcendental freedom (CPR, B 561) and which, surprisingly, “can be proved through experience” (CPR, B 830). This is especially noteworthy because transcendental freedom “seems to be contrary to […] all possible experience” (CPR, B 831). This paper dissolves the so-called canon problem , according to which Kant’s theory of practical freedom in the CPR is inconsistent. It is argued that the concept of “experience” refers to a subject’s ability to become aware of the process of autonomous self-necessitation and thereby constitute herself as an agent. The action, in this case, represents the appearance of intelligible causality and a potential object of experience.

Abstract: This paper, on a forgotten letter by Immanuel Kant to his publisher Friedrich Nicolovius (February 7, 1800), argues for the authenticity of the revisions in the second edition of Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , i.e. that these revisions must be ascribed to Kant himself and not, as has been argued in current Kant research, to Christian Gottfried Schütz. A transcription of the letter is provided.