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Bemerkungen zu Oliver Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity, Chapter 1

  • Dieter Schönecker EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: March 20, 2015
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Abstract:

In this paper I sketchily deal with some critical points concerning the first chapter of Oliver Sensen’s book, Kant on Human Dignity. These points are as follows: (i) Sensen interprets only a few passages in any great detail; (ii) where we do encounter more precise analysis, Sensen suggests that human beings are to be respected just because one must respect them; (iii) Sensen criticizes a position (according to which Kant has a concept of value that is independent of the moral law) that is obviously wrong and, in any case, not the crucial point; (iv) Sensen misconceives the function of respect as something that grounds knowledge; (v) he is wrong to consider freedom a non-normative concept; (vi) he does not sufficiently clarify the precise meaning of “metaphysical”; (vii) section III of the Groundwork is virtually ignored; and (viii) Sensen overlooks the fact that the relational property (ist erhoben über) is based on an intrinsic property (hat Würde).

Published Online: 2015-3-20
Published in Print: 2015-3-20

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