Band 66, Heft 1

The essay – an elaborated version of my academic farewell speech [Abschiedsvorlesung] – discusses three theses: 1. Histories and history as well as history of philosophy and philosophy of history can only be staged as narratives. “True” stories enact the past and deliver schemes for anticipating the future; insofar history and future constitute the semantics of the present. 2. “Systematic” philosophy analyses the temporal narratives which store the historical experiences and eliminates their temporality in a process of transforming narratives into arguments. The most important step in this transformation consists in isolating the key notions of the narratives and in arranging these key notions in a “timeless” systematic order. 3. History of philosophy and philosophy of history restage, however, the temporal narrative, which systematic philosophy wants to eliminate from philosophy. This operation produces an unsolvable paradox where the claim of timeless truth and that of unescapable temporality are both valid. It throws up questions such as: how can it be possible for philosophical truths to lose their credit? Do timeless truths exist, and if so what do they mean? Do these paradoxes lead to schadenfreude on the part of the historian of philosophy, who knew it all along, or should one see these unsolvable complexities as a chance to enjoy the richness of possibilities which history unfolds? The essay chooses the second alternative.

This paper argues that Kant’s argument in favor of the primacy of the categories over the world is embedded in a Maimonidean stream of theorizing. In terms of how words and concepts are configured in relation to possible entities outside of themselves, it recapitulates Maimonides’ argument concerning how to situate the human world in relation to God. The judge in Maimonides is the human being who ideally encodes in his character and personality the metaphysical stance reflected in Kant’s categories and Maimonides’ theorizing of God.

Theories of personal identity in the tradition of John Locke and Derek Parfit emphasize the importance of psychological continuity and the abilities to think, to remember and to make rational choices as a basic criterion for personhood. These concepts, however, are situated within a dualistic framework, in which the body is regarded as a mere vehicle of the person, or a carrier of the brain as the organ of mental faculties. Based on the phenomenology of embodiment, this paper elaborates a different approach to personal identity. In this perspective, selfhood is primarily constituted by pre-reflective self-awareness and the body memory of an individual, which consists in the embodiment and enactment of familiar habits, practices and preferences. As can be shown, this understanding of personhood still applies to dementia patients even in the later stages of the disease.

With reference to Joel Feinberg and Stephen Darwall, this paper develops a concept of human dignity which considers dignity as a fragile and vulnerable quality that can be lost and violated in specific situations. In contrast to holistic approaches to dignity, it requires the recognition of others as a source for a person’s normative authority about his or her life. Pre-forms of this concept are also relevant in the organisation of dementia care. In order to maintain the normative authority about the lives of dementia patients, care-givers are encouraged to respect their expressive actions and responses. Ignoring these expressions constitutes a violation of the dignity of dementia sufferers.

Family members and professional care-givers are often confronted with challenging and self-destructive behaviours of people suffering from dementia, and it is not clear at all if these situations should be regulated by principles of autonomy or by principles of care, which consider the best interests of the patients. With reference to a thought experiment, this paper argues that it is not possible to control these situations by implementing principles of autonomy. Instead, while taking into account the patients’ capacity to consent, it is better to apply principles of care in challenging situations.

The recently discovered first draft of Heidegger’s What Is Metaphysics? , his Inaugural Lecture in Freiburg from 1929, is published here for the first time. It differs from the version known so far in numerous, philosophically relevant details. The first draft is marked by a fierce attack on “science,” a dramatic invocation of “nothingness,” and a sharp critique of the current state of philosophy or of philosophy as such. An editorial note addresses philological issues concerning the status of this text and its authenticity. An extended commentary situates it within Heidegger’s writings of the period and discusses its preparatory role with regard to his National-Socialist turn. As What Is Metaphysics? – together with Carnap’s response in “Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” – serves as a reference point for the great divide between so-called analytic and so-called continental philosophy, this original version is an opportunity to reassess its premises and limits.