Volume 66, Issue 5

Meanings are felt and lived by the human organism before they are articulated. Following insights from pragmatism and embodied cognition, this paper suggests that there is an ‘appropriate’ relationship between what is meant and was is expressed in words and actions that can be formulated as a hitherto neglected yet crucial validity claim, namely congruity (Stimmigkeit). Congruity is what connects the meaningfulness implicit in living a life with the articulated meanings of symbolic communication. We distinguish between the intertwined aspects of (1) semiotic congruity , the fusion between sensual patterns and semiotic meanings, (2) performative congruity , the freedom and ability to articulate qualitatively experienced meaningfulness, and (3) hermeneutic congruity , the capability of achieving congruence between situational meanings and one’s entire being-in-the-world. The latter presupposes a synthesis of horizontal (biographical and experiental) and vertical (pertaining to the relation between the several strata of cultural meanings) congruity .

Kant introduces a duty to oneself to respect oneself and to avoid servility – or not to make oneself a worm . I argue for a wider understanding of this duty: Persons ought to respect their own dignity as persons with autonomy, rationality, and morality (A), but also as personalities, who embody dignity and live a dignified life (B). A corresponds to Kant’s concept of duty as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law, B is an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as an individual personality in a socio-cultural context. A and B relate to two types of dignity that are discussed in current debates. I argue that both types of dignity are equally relevant for understanding and respecting one’s own dignity. Finally I discuss why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.

The paper explores the ontology of ‚ought‘ ( Sollen ) by analyzing ought-sentences ( Sollsätze ). It claims that ought-sentences are pragmatically ambiguous between a prescriptive and a descriptive reading, and argues that there is a close connection between the function of prescriptive ought-sentences and the truth conditions of descriptive ought-sentences. More precisely, the paper contends that the truth conditions of descriptive ought-sentences, and thereby oughtness itself, is grounded in desire ( Wollen ).

Peter Stemmer has developed an elegant and impressive theory of normativity and morality. In this article, I try to show that he does not achieve two goals he set for himself. First, his theory does not capture the categorical bindingness of moral demands, even in Stemmer’s own interpretation of categorical bindingness: it does not show that we must follow moral demands no matter what our personal goals and desires are. Second, just because it would be rational to establish positive moralities in a hypothetical pre-moral scenario, it does not follow – and Stemmer does not establish – that only positive moralities that are in the interest of all members (and contain a prohibition on oppression) are legitimate . For that reason, his contractarian theory collapses into relativism.

Peter Stemmer advocates a new foundation of morality. He claims that any moral principle is justified only if every person to whom the principle applies consents to it on the basis of his or her own interests. But how can this ‘metanorm’ of unanimous consent be justified? Since Stemmer decisively rejects all objectivist foundations of morality, the only justification for his ‘metanorm’ can again be nothing but a unanimous consent. Through numerous examples I hope to have shown in my article that the alleged connexion of all our moral demands with a general, unanimous consent is not realistic – no matter whether these demands are based on our spontaneous or on our well considered attitudes. And this holds no less for legal norms with their hard sanctions than for moral principles.

Peter Stemmer provides a moral theory that construes moral normativity and correlated phenomenona as essentially constituted by sanctions. Neither Stemmer nor his critics reflect sufficiently on the metaethical status of these claims, even though it is important to be clear about this status to evaluate the approach. I argue that there are two different readings of the theory: Either the “Sanktionstheorie” is a kind of descriptive metaethical theory or it is what I call a constructive (or revisionary ) theory. Stemmer’s approach is better understood as a constructive metaethical theory, whereas critics mainly focus on a descriptive reading.

The claim, renewed some years ago, of being able to advise on personal questions of life seems to bring philosophy into a fundamental conflict with its other claim of promoting human self-determination. However, the conflict only arises if philosophy does not sufficiently distinguish between the social orientation of self-determination towards universality and the subjective orientation of action execution. This is the case both in subjectivist mentalism and in the tradition of philosophy of language. The insufficient distinction prevents philosophy not only from being able to be helpful in the case of action but also from adequately explaining its object, the human orientation of validity. Plessner clarifies the basis of the practical distinction between social validity and subjective action orientation. Against this background we can better understand Socrates’ and Wittgenstein’s views on how philosophy must proceed in discourse if it is to provide assistance in personal questions without paternalism.