Volume 65, Issue 3

It is, of course, impossible to provide examples of inconceivable possibilities. The argument for their existence has to be developed on the basis of general principles and the paper accordingly seeks to show that this can be done in a credible manner. The core of the argument is (1) that our conceptions have to be developed linguistically, (2) that whatever can be managed by language has to proceed recursively, so that in consequence only a denumerable number of conceivable outcomes can be realized, and (3) that there is no reason to think that the range of Reality – let alone the range of Possibility – is of merely denumerable scope.

The paper examines a theory of normativity according to which norms are practical reasons constituted by sanctions. It argues that such a theory faces a number of objections derived from the concept of a sanction as an artificial, negative consequence of an action. In particular, the paper demonstrates that sanctions in this sense are not triggered by the performance of the action itself (as, for example, murder or theft), but rather by the agent’s appearing to have performed these actions. Thus, the sanction theory of normativity is unable to explain why the intended actions themselves – rather than the corresponding appearances – are forbidden. I conclude with a discussion of alternative conceptions of norms.

Lukács’ famously asked: “What is orthodox Marxism?” His answer was that a certain method was quintessential. What if we ask the orthodox question about Critical Theory? The answer in this case, I propose, is not a particular method. Moreover, what’s critical about Critical Theory is also not – contrary to prevailing opinions in the literature – a program of justification. In fact, only without such a program can Critical Theory be adequately and appropriately critical. The position I advocate returns to insights from Horkheimer’s writings of the 1930s (and Adorno’s work). Indeed, it is also orthodox in another sense: taking the conviction of a partisan interest – the interest in abolishing social injustice, misery and unfreedom – as the only general criterion for Critical Theory. Its task is to contribute to the struggle against the aforementioned negative elements through conceptual work, self-reflection, and a critical appropriation of the genuine insights of traditional theorising. I conclude by outlining briefly the implications of this position for the mode of approaching social philosophy (and specifically the idea of social pathology).

The article refers to social, economic and cultural developments (summed up under the notion of “modernity”) to explain why authority as it was long understood in philosophical and sociological debates is no longer effective. Though the phenomenon of authority has not disappeared from all areas of personal and social life, it is no longer based on a clear structure of male hierarchies, and thus it seems necessary to think about new ways of conceptualizing it. Hannah Arendt’s political theory and Richard Sennett’s socio-anthropological approach are used to describe a core concept of “modern” authority. With the help of ideas from current discourses in some of the “new” professions – e. g. psychotherapy – this concept is further elaborated in an attempt to understand “postmodern” relationships. The last section of the article concentrates on the issue of gender – arguing that the traditionally close linkage between authority and maleness (still a subtext in many discussions) is no longer convincing.

In her essay “What is authority” Hannah Arendt wonders whether “What was authority?” would have been the more appropriate title. This paper aims to show that authority is indeed a contemporary phenomenon and one that is taking on ever greater significance. Arendt’s work on authority is used to support conclusions that she herself did not draw. These can be useful for the understanding of authority within today’s political and civil realms. With respect to the political system of representative democracies, the paper challenges Arendt’s claim that authority has vanished from contemporary societies and points to two new figures of authority, namely the expert and the populist. It diagnoses the comeback of the old antagonism between a metaphysical and a democratic justification of authority.

The authors argue that modernity can be defined by a critique of political and social authority. Authority may be described as a form of power; it cannot be understood as an attribute of individuals, but as a form of social interaction, a clear model of which can be found in the relationship between teacher and student. Authority in this sense can be viewed as a way of giving and receiving orientation. It comes in degrees, as part of an ongoing social process of ascription, driven by emotional dynamics such as respect, esteem, admiration, fear and shame. Authority in the modern sense is not only less hierarchical than in the case of classical stereotypes, but also less dependent on traditional male images. The price paid by modern authority, however, is that it is a less visible form of authority, one that has little representation in the popular imagination.

This is the first edition of three letters written by Prince August of Saxe-Gotha-Altenburg to the German theologian Johann Gottfried Herder in the years 1784 and 1785. As son of the Duchess Louise Dorothea, Prince August was very familiar with the German and French Enlightenment. He intensely read works by Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius and similar authors and was able to form his own judgements, even on metaphysical treatises. He described, for example, Spinoza’s philosophy as “dry grammatical-metaphysical claptrap”. His letters to Herder are full of devastating irony, intelligent humour and wit. They give an interesting insight into the intellectual’s debates on literature, philosophy, theology, and arts which are clearly separated from political affairs. The Research Library of Gotha preserves a copy of nearly 200 letters of the prince to Herder.

In this essay I attempt to clarify the understanding of modernity that can be found in the writings of the Chinese thinker Wang Hui, especially in his magnum opus on The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought (2004). In this book, Wang describes the trajectory of major conceptual and paradigmatic changes from antiquity to modern China. I present and critically discuss important premises of this project, in particular Wang’s assumption that the formation of Chinese modernity is characterized by a dialectical tension between “critique/emancipation” and “control/order”. According to Wang, this tension is already present in the Neo-Confucian world-view, a rather convincing claim as I show in the second part of this essay. It is less clear, however, whether Wang succeeds in grounding Chinese modernity in the historical reality of late imperial China. In the last part, I provide discussion and suggestions for future research.

This paper is concerned with a threefold task: (1) I want to show that truth is an existential value. This means that truth is something which is intimately connected with our interest in having a good and self-determined life. (2) My thesis is that such a life is possible only in a truth-oriented society. And a truth-oriented society can’t be imagined without philosophy and sciences playing an important orienting role in it. So a truth-oriented society is in a certain sense a scientific and philosophical society. (3) My aim is therefore to justify (the idea of) a scientific society and especially philosophy as a social institution of ongoing Enlightenment.

Building on my experiences as a student, PhD candidate and researcher, this “letter from Norway” presents some characteristics of philosophy at the University of Bergen. First, I describe a basic philosophy course that is obligatory for each student at the university. As this “examen philosophicum” provides a common ground for graduates from all subjects, philosophy is still present in Norwegian public discourse. Second, I follow one specific thread in the history of Bergen’s philosophy department, focusing on the philosophy of language and Wittgenstein studies that began with the first professor and is still practiced, for example with recent digital editing. In this context I also sketch the working conditions for PhD-students and researchers today. Finally, a brief exposition of the original praxeology of Jakob Meløe allows me to formulate what I found so characteristic of philosophy in Bergen: the recognition and appreciation of specific and individual experiences in doing philosophy.