Volume 65, Issue 5

Freud’s metapsychology has been interpreted in a number of different ways. Some scholars see him committed to classical scientism, others to genuine hermeneutics. Many Freud philologists suggest that he moved from an early scientism to hermeneutic methods in his later writings, and some think he misunderstood his own angle, thinking himself to be a natural scientist, but actually practising hermeneutics. The article first looks at Freud’s model of the soul and his remarks about psychoanalytic explanations and concludes that there is overwhelming evidence for the contention that he conceived of psychoanalytic explanations in terms of causal explanations and that his metapsychology is, all things considered, scientistic. However, it seems that Freud did not clearly distinguish between causal and rational explanations (i. e. genuine interpretations). The article emphasizes that he could have found this distinction in the writings of Max Weber. In the last two sections, the article turns to a meticulous analysis of two vignettes describing Freud’s own treatment of two cases that he takes to be fine examples of the technique used in psychoanalytic treatment. It turns out that Freud himself looks at these cases and their treatment, throughout, in terms of rationality and irrationality. In particular, he seems to distinguish between an “external” irrationality and an “internal” rationality of neurotic diseases. He also seems to point to functions of neuroses representing certain solutions for mental disturbances. Thus, there is much evidence for assuming that in his psychoanalytic technique, Freud relied on genuine hermeneutic and functional methods; and therefore, Freud’s official metapsychology seems to be methodologically inconsistent with his analytic technique.

According to Kant, building moral character is not limited to developing rational capacities but also includes developing emotional capacities as well as responsibly managing and deliberately cultivating emotional dispositions. Kant assigns central importance specifically to the cultivation of sympathy. This paper first distinguishes three levels on which sympathy is significant in Kant’s ethics. Referring to recent philosophical and psychological research, it then aims to reconstruct the process of cultivating sympathy in a way that is persuasive both as an interpretation of Kant and as a systematic account. Contrary to what Kant’s brief comments on this process seem to suggest, cultivating sympathy does not consist in a mere stimulation of a natural emotional mechanism – this, I argue, would be inconsistent with central concerns of Kantian ethics. Rather, it consists in a morally motivated, reflexive transformation of a natural disposition that aims to make us responsive to the needs of others.

Under what conditions are we justified in believing what people tell us? Traditionally, the answer has either been reductionist or anti-reductionist. Either our justification reduces to non-testimonial reasons, or we have a presumptive, though defeasible, right to believe what we are told. However, some philosophers have argued that we need to look beyond this dichotomy. Following this line of thought, this paper examines and criticizes a recent proposal by John Greco. According to Greco, testimony has two functions: (1) passing on information within an epistemic community; (2) receiving information from an outside source. (1) calls for anti-reductionism, while (2) requires reductive reasons. In response to Greco, several cases are presented, showing that his position leads to counterintuitive consequences. In the light of this result, an alternative, risk-dependent, account is put forward. It is argued that the practical risks connected to receiving false information determine which epistemic treatment is appropriate.

Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche and, more recently, Ruediger Bittner argued that regret is unreasonable. My article criticises this view and describes what I consider to be the common-sense understanding of regret: In some – but not all – cases of flawed actions it is unreasonable to regret what one did. The article characterises the common-sense understanding by eight principles and offers an explication of core concepts.

Hitherto, ethics has barely addressed the normative significance of time and timeliness themselves. This contribution first distinguishes between four elementary respects in which time is normatively significant. This is followed by an investigation into the temporal dimension of distributive, restitutive, and retributive justice. It is shown that aspects of temporal duration and intervals are every bit as relevant for a theory of justice as are the finiteness of human life and of interpersonal relations.

Two authors with a similar philosophical biography write this letter from Serbia. First the German professor is introduced to the history of Serbian philosophy. Special attention is given to the relations between German and Serbian philosophy. Subsequently, the present situation of philosophy in Serbia is described, including the toil and deprivation implied in occupying oneself with philosophy in this country. The authors demonstrate that in these circumstances, enthusiasm and personal dedication are of the essence.