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The philosophical “Recognition” debate may be advanced by exploring recognition theory as a means to justify a concrete policy in the form of Universal Basic Income (UBI). UBI advocacy may also be strengthened by exploring the potential effects of UBI on the manner in which individuals value each other, using theories of recognition. Following a review of the Fraser/Honneth “redistribution or recognition?” debate, Honneth’s theory is deemed most suitable for the purpose of a normative justification of UBI. What is of interest is his emphasis on the manner in which recognition principles change over time, through processes of social reproduction and conflicting values, and his treatment of the importance of reciprocity of recognition. By separating out the spheres of recognition in Honneth’s theory and their developmental trajectories, it is possible to highlight the value of UBI as a concrete policy initiative that will potentially make significant progress towards the recognition ideal.

According to the Peruvian Constitution, the legal minimum age for child workers is 12 years old, making it the youngest level in Latin America and among other continents. More than 2 million children in Peru are employed in agriculture, gold mines, as domestic workers and street sellers. Peru is one of the latest countries where conditional cash transfers have been implemented in Latin America. This paper addresses the debate on conditional versus unconditional cash transfers in enhancing school attendance and consequently eradicating child labour and the broader question of targeted versus universal approaches in basic rights and income. Factors such as household’s vulnerability, which can potentially lead to child labour, are highlighted. This paper also examines the method of targeting and the exclusion of groups at greater risk such as street children and single mothers. It uses recent quantitative data from the World Bank and the Peruvian government (2011) and data collected from interviews with programme executives of United Nations agencies and NGOs. It concludes that the only sustainable way to enhance the life chances of Peruvian children is to create strong mechanisms of social protection, such as basic services and income, that are available to every household.

The potential economic effects of implementing a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) in the United States are examined using a small-scale computable general equilibrium model in which labor and saving are the fundamental household decision variables. The social choice variables consist of BIG (termed herein “guaranteed minimum consumption”) and public good expenditure. Assuming the model’s benchmark values for the social choice variables are a reasonable approximation to the current situation, solution for the optimal social choice variables suggests that a much larger BIG would be preferable from a social welfare standpoint. This basic result is relatively insensitive to alterations in the model’s parameters. However, there would be such a substantial reduction in aggregate output and saving from moving to the optimal position that the political feasibility of any such policy shift is doubtful, regardless of any indications from economic analysis.