Volume 8, Issue 1 -

Italy still lacks a nationwide rationally designed mechanism of income support. In this paper, we explore the feasibility and the optimal features of a universal policy of minimum income in Italy. We use a microeconometric model and a social welfare methodology in order to evaluate various alternative mechanisms. We simulate the effects and the social welfare performance of 15 reforms resulting from three versions of five basic types of income support mechanism: guaranteed minimum income (GMI), unconditional basic income (UBI), wage subsidy (WS) and two mixed systems: GMI with WS and UBI with WS. As a welfare evaluation criterion, we adopt the Gini Social Welfare function. All the reforms are calibrated so as to preserve fiscal neutrality. The optimal policy turns out to be a version of UBI with WS, namely an unconditional transfer covering 37.5% of the Poverty Level coupled with a 10% WS, with a total average benefit amounting to about 70% of the Poverty Level.

The debate on the desirability of a Basic Income (BI) for women has polarized between those who defend the measure as a way of reducing gender inequalities and those who believe that the policy could worsen the gender gap. This article argues for the former position, introducing the problem of domestic service, a paradigm of inequality not only between the genders but also among women. First, different dimensions of the “domestic service problem” are discussed in order to challenge the view that domestic service could be a “solution” for some gender inequalities. Second, it is argued that BI could significantly reduce outsourcing of reproductive work (at least in the private sphere) and could encourage women to demand equality in the home and a better public provision of care services. These effects of a BI could lead to a fairer overall system in terms of gender and class.

This paper deals with labour supply side effects of implementing an unconditional basic income scheme. Specifically, the German welfare as well as tax and social contributions system are investigated. The results clarify that the abolishment of the so-called unemployment trap due to a basic income policy is a decisive advantage of this approach. In order to demonstrate possible labour supply side reactions to a basic income policy, we use the neoclassical labour supply model and adapt it to our purposes. We compare the effects of implementing a basic income on different types of employees concerning their consumption preferences. We show that, even in the neoclassical labour supply model without intrinsic work motivation, an unconditional basic income increases the participation rate in the labour market. Furthermore, current employees are given only partial incentives to increase their labour supply. Therefore, a basic income not only would reduce unemployment but also could expand the magnitude of employment

Since January 2008 a monthly Basic Income Grant (BIG) of N$ 100 (about US$ 15) has been paid to around 1,000 citizens of the Namibian village of Otjivero. (In January 2010 it is reduced to N$ 80.) The project is called a “pilot project”, because its intention is to convince the government to extend the scheme to the whole country. This article shares the view that a new approach to social policy in Namibia is indeed desirable, because poverty is severe and income inequality is very high in an international perspective. The article addresses two questions: First, are the design and the conduct of the project and the assessment of its effects in line with established standards of empirical socio-economic research? In other words, are the reported behavioral effects of the BIG in Otjivero convincingly derived? Second, did the project sufficiently address issues which are of particular relevance for an eventual positive political decision? The article comes to the conclusion that neither of the questions can be answered in the affirmative. At the end, the article derives recommendations for possible future BIG projects.

This article argues for a Citizens Basic Income (CBI) on the basis of the potential the proposal has for addressing gender-based inequalities, particularly with reference to the world of paid work. The nature and level of public spending cuts evident across Europe have had a disproportionate impact on women both as providers and users of key public services. This is largely due to the very gendered nature of care work, paid and unpaid. A CBI provides the basis for transforming welfare policy to adequately account for the value and contribution of care work to the economy.

So far, most options for protecting the viability of Social Security have tinkered with financing and eligibility rules that do nothing about design flaws that led to our current fiscal crisis – regressive transfers, unfunded liabilities, and inefficient funding of retirement benefits. Under the current system, payroll taxes rob the first dollars of earnings from the working poor and from others who would prefer real savings to a promise of future benefits from the government, while retirees who do not need public support fight for their earned benefits. My proposal, Social Security Basic Income, replaces a rigid formula for forced savings and intergenerational transfers with a pay-as-you-go welfare program funded from general revenue that provides basic income to poor people, regardless of age. Comparative static analysis of the impact of this system on individuals finds that a generous safety net will not significantly increase total federal expenditures or individual tax burdens.