Band 24, Heft 2

This paper analyzes the Ak model with anticipated future consumption. In the model with internal anticipation individual’s utility depends on current consumption and a forward-looking reference level which is formed from individual’s own future consumption. The global dynamics of the economy is characterized by means of a qualitative phase diagram analysis. In the model with external anticipation the consumption reference level is formed from economy-wide average future consumption, which is taken as given by individuals and causes the competitive equilibrium to be inefficient. Characterizing the global dynamics of the economy is required to characterize an optimal fiscal policy that corrects the inefficiency brought about by this external effect.

In this study, we examine a contest scenario where each player possesses a distinct head start that skews their chances of winning, thereby creating incentive distortions from the efficient level and adversely affecting the contest designer. While affirmative action policies offer a straightforward solution to counteract these distortions, their implementation may not always be viable in real-life applications. We characterize the unique class of non-discriminatory contest success functions (CSF) that enables to achieve an efficient level of effort when there are two players. Additionally, we demonstrate that achieving a symmetric equilibrium is unattainable without affirmative action when the contest involves more than two players.

This paper analyzes the effect of price leadership on collusion among firms with different discount factors. We first find that price leadership relaxes the incentive constraints for collusion. We then derive a dynamic collusion path in which the firms with lower discount factors initially occupy the largest market share and then gradually cede it to the firms with higher discount factors. This collusion path is shaped by the conflicting forces of fairness and efficiency. Additionally, price leadership can restore the efficiency implied by differentiated time preferences in repeated games.

We study a principal–agent model in which a legislature and a bureaucrat sequentially play the principal’s role. In the first stage, the legislature offers a menu of transfer payments to the bureaucrat for implementing a public project. In the second stage, the bureaucrat offers a menu of the project attribute levels to the legislature. Then, the legislature decides whether to go forward with the project and aggregates information on the public’s valuation of the project. The key trade-off in this paper is information versus the bureaucrat’s loyalty. We show that when the bureaucrat is loyal enough to the public, taking advantage of his loyalty requires inducing him to make his decision independent of the public’s valuation.

We study under what conditions product information sufficiently unravels in a competitive environment. Information sufficiently unravels if the consumer makes the same purchasing decision as under complete information. The consumer is uncertain about the sellers’ product characteristics while she has private information about her preference for differentiated products. In contrast to the prior literature, we focus on the case where the sellers compete to attract the consumer by disclosing product information only after they set prices for their individual products. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the consumer’s relative comparison of one seller’s product to the other’s for every outcome to be sufficient unraveling under comparative and non-comparative advertisements, respectively. We show, by example, that competition may enhance information disclosure only if the consumer has limited reasoning capability.

This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain commitment power to set price paths. The type of monopolist is private information of the firm and not observable to consumers. If commitment to future prices is not possible, the initial price is high in equilibrium, but the firm falls prey to the Coase conjecture later to capture the residual demand. The relative price cut is increasing in the probability of commitment as buyers anticipate that a steady price is likely and purchase early. Pooling in prices may occur for perpetuity if commitment is sufficiently weak.

I develop a dynamic general-equilibrium model that combines the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides labor market with the standard Ricardian model of international trade to investigate the potential role of unemployment as a justification for trade policy implementation. First, I compare a competitive equilibrium and a constrained-efficient equilibrium and then establish the condition in which the competitive equilibrium is constrained-efficient. Second, I show that free trade is optimal only when labor market inefficiency is absent. A small open economy may employ expansionary trade policies (such as export subsidies or reduced import tariffs) if it experiences inefficiently high unemployment. This study provides a rationale behind countries’ tendency to use export subsidies.

We examine the effects of reduced transport costs on a firm’s horizontal product innovation activity and consumer welfare. It is well established that trade liberalization, including reducing transport costs, could enable innovative practices and make consumers better off. Trade theory, in particular, commonly asserts that zero transport costs maximize consumer surplus. In contrast, we demonstrate that (i) reduced transport costs can enhance a firm’s incentives for investment; however, (ii) positive transport costs (trade barrier) can maximize consumer surplus.

In this paper, I study the role of an informed intermediary in improving market efficiency through communication with a buyer and a seller. Based on a double auction setting, I introduce an agent who is partially informed about the private information of a buyer and a seller. The agent can disclose information to either both parties, one party, or none of them. I compare the two most common incentives of the agent, maximizing either trade probability or expected price, in information disclosure. The analysis shows that the former incentive improves efficiency more than the latter; the agent with the former always discloses all relevant information, resulting in not only a higher trade probability but also a higher expected price. The buyer and the seller mostly prefer the agent disclosing information to both parties. When the agent discloses information to only one party, the buyer and the seller desire to be the one who receives the information exclusively. They sometimes prefer the agent disclosing information exclusively to the other party over no information for all. The findings of this paper have important implications for the design of compensation schemes for intermediaries who play a significant role as advisors to market participants.

This article examines firms’ choices on partial (in)attention prior to quantity competition. Being partially (in)attentive, a firm accounts for a part of its market impact. We find that regardless of the number of firms, there is always a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where all firms choose to be partially attentive. The optimal attention level decreases in the number of firms, increases in product differentiation, and converges to zero, i.e. firms tend to be fully inattentive, as either the number of firms goes to infinity or product differentiation goes to zero.

This article explores the relationship between product design and advertising, traditionally viewed as distinct business decisions. I build upon the seminal work of Matutes and Regibeau (1988. “Mix and Match: Product Compatibility Without Network Externalities.” The RAND Journal of Economics 19 (2): 221–34), where firms produce components that combine to form product systems, and introduce the necessity for firms to advertise their products to create consumer awareness. I find that a firm’s incentive to advertise increases with product compatibility. Greater product compatibility reduces competition, encouraging firms to broaden their market presence through advertising. Contrary to Matutes and Regibeau, when advertising influences product awareness, consumers prefer products with moderate compatibility over those that are entirely incompatible. Consequently, advertising aligns the compatibility preferences of both firms and consumers.

Recent theoretical advances suggest that capital income risk, rather than earnings uncertainty, is the key determinant of fat-tailed behavior of stationary wealth distributions. I provide novel insights into this issue by studying an incomplete market model with general time and state separable preferences, where parental altruism and unobservable idiosyncratic shocks engender non-linear bequest rules. I analytically pin down conditions on the preference structure and other model’s primitives under which optimal bequest behavior hinders intergenerational wealth transmission for any degree of capital income risk, causing the dynamics of wealth to converge to a unique (stationary) distribution with thin tails. These results imply, in particular, that (i) the stochastic properties of labour income risk (as shaped by, e.g. fiscal policies) may play a role in defining the structure of the upper tail of the limiting distribution of wealth, and that (ii) matching empirically documented fat tails with choice theoretic frameworks of wealth dynamics requires joint restrictions on preferences and calibrated earnings processes to be met.